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      The U.S. Department of Defense is engaged in budget cutbacks that will have significant future 
implications for many defense programs.  At the same time, emerging global threats require investment in 
diverse mechanisms for national defense over the long-term.  Within this context, it is important to highlight 
the effectiveness of less traditional softer approaches to security in comparison to their cost as many of them 
may best be accomplished by the country‟s hard power agency.  This thesis explores three different soft power 
programs either funded and/or managed by the U.S. Military or Department of Defense: educating foreign 
military officers, deploying U.S. Navy medical ships on proactive humanitarian missions, and funding biological 
scientific engagement to counter the use of biological weapons of mass destruction.  Each chapter analyzes the 
primary question of the individual program‟s substance in comparison to its cost.  The thesis acknowledges the 
difficulties of assessing the less quantifiable concept of soft power but seeks to make a qualitative assessment of 
each program‟s relative value.  This assessment is done by applying generated metrics shaped by reviewing 
literature applicable to each program‟s goals to case studies of countries where each program has been 
implemented.  Conclusions on the three programs‟ current soft power influence is determined on the basis of 
existing data as applied to these expressed metrics.  Additionally, based on evidence of the measurable metrics, 
each chapter draws a conclusion about its program‟s indeterminable value in the future.  Overall, this thesis 
contends that although modest and somewhat imprecise, measurable increases to U.S. soft power due to these 
programs can be shown.  Furthermore, their relative low costs, along with their potential benefits to American 
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“In this turbulent new century, the security of the United States will depend increasingly on how we 
engage, persuade, and inspire people in countries in the rest of the world.”1 
- Gen Anthony Zinni (ret) and ADM James Stavridis (ret) 
 
     In the 1990s Joseph Nye first coined the phrase “soft power,” defined as the ability to attain 
one‟s own goals through actions that elicit the admiration and desired emulation of others.2  As a form of 
influence, it is the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”3  
Over the past decade, the U.S. government has started to recognize the importance of this less 
conventional approach to global security in a rapidly changing and complex environment.  For example, 
the 1998 National Security Strategy (NSS) discussed and alluded to partnerships with the international 
community on 10 occasions, whereas the 2010 NSS made it a cornerstone of the strategy, mentioning 
“partnerships” in over 40 instances.4  Inevitably, resources drive action, and funding has not matched the 
rhetoric to develop and deploy softer approaches to national security.  For decades, the budget for hard 
power programs through defense has dwarfed the budget for programs in diplomacy and development.  
Many softer programs, designed to invest in partnerships and operations to expand American influence 
and American legitimacy, are not only extremely low cost, but also effective and add an important 
additional instrument that can be leveraged given the changing security environment.  Ironically, the reality 
remains that some of these more cost effective softer power approaches today may best be accomplished 
by the country‟s hard power resource, the Department of Defense (DOD).  Soft power programs nested 
within the Defense Department have been under recognized, underfunded and under researched relative 
to their hard power counterparts. 
                                                          
                 1 Anthony Zinni and James Stavridis. “Civilian Smart Power Key to Real Victory,” USA Today, 4 December 2013, 
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/12/04/us-security-globalizationmilitary-column/3863197/>. 
                 2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 
                 3 Joseph S. Nye Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2005) x. 
                 4 White House. National Security Strategy: May 2010 (Washington D.C.: 2010) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>.  




      Highlighting the value and price of soft power approaches is more important now than it was a 
decade ago.  With overall federal budget cutbacks already in law, there is clearly movement to reduce costs 
within the DOD, purposed to provide hard power programs of enormous proportion, and some of 
questionable value.  In an attempt to shrink defense budgets, it may be tempting to reduce funding for 
softer programs because their value for dollar spent is more difficult to measure.  While it‟s challenging to 
define the effectiveness of softer power programs, this thesis contends that these programs do have 
significant value.   In fact, due to the nature of future threats, such as potential biological attacks, and 
militarization caused by environmental resource insecurities, softer tactics may become increasingly 
important security tools for the United States.  This paper examines three different soft power programs 
either funded and/or managed by the Department of Defense.  Within each chapter, this paper will 
address such questions as: what is the relevance of the program?  Can we find tangible measures of 
effectiveness of the program?  And are the programs worth the investment?  
      Chapter one of this paper examines the soft power effect of the U.S. government‟s International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which seeks to educate foreign military leaders.  This 
chapter asks whether the IMET program affects a foreign military‟s “democratic” values and policies.5  
This chapter examines case studies of American IMET education with three “partly free” countries‟ 
militaries (Bangladesh, Ukraine, and Nigeria) over a twenty-year period to determine if some level of 
improvement in democratic values among the three countries is linked to the U.S. education of their 
military leaders.6  Whenever there was evidence of an increase in a foreign military‟s respect for civilian 
control or its respect for human rights over time, the analysis traces the sources of these changes to look 
for any potential connections to the training that the military leadership received through the IMET 
program.  In all three case studies, slight progress in democratic values, although inconsistent, could be 
indirectly linked to education provided by the IMET program.  Even though distinct consistent 
improvement cannot be seen with regards to the democratic values, the chapter finds that the slight 
progress that is indirectly linked to IMET is worth the effort given the program‟s broader role in 
developing security relationships and creating enduring partnerships for a relatively low cost. 
                                                          
            5 Note: “Democratic” military values are defined as respecting civilian control of the military and respecting human rights 
both internal and external to a military‟s host country. 
            6 Note: “Partly Free” as defined by Freedom House Rankings for 2010. 
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      Chapter two examines the U.S. Navy‟s proactive use of hospital ships – a soft power program 
developed as a result of changing global environmental dynamics.  Researchers are finding more evidence 
of climate change every day.  Environmental fluctuations have already been manifested in increasingly 
powerful natural disasters in the past decade.  Disasters such as typhoons, tsunamis, and hurricanes 
brought about by man-made or natural causes can have unpredictable future bearing on global security by 
exacerbating migration, starvation, and disease.  How the United States responds to this issue of global 
human security directly impacts world perception of America, either as a disinterested giant, or an attuned, 
generous responder.  Policymakers have increasingly acknowledged the importance of a national response 
to climate change.  The U.S. Navy has adapted to the perceived environmental threat by increasing its 
emphasis on the softer humanitarian operations, not only in reactive disaster relief missions but also in 
proactive medical missions around the world.   
      Chapter two asks the specific question: does the U.S. Navy‟s increased use of proactive 
humanitarian assistance medical deployments improve U.S. visibility, access, and influence in the regions in 
which they take place?  To assess this question, this chapter looks at three case studies of countries hosting 
annual U.S. Navy humanitarian deployments (Indonesia, Colombia, and Vietnam) over the past seven 
years.  Links between the deployments and an increase in U.S. access and influence in a region were 
determined by analyzing any increased military-to-military or diplomatic contacts and cooperation resulting 
from the humanitarian outreach.  Any increase in U.S. visibility in a region was determined by researching 
the extent and character of local media attention and public opinion resulting from the deployments.  
Despite the lack of both data and literature on the soft power effects of humanitarian ship deployments, 
this chapter concludes that there is a connection between these deployments and increases in U.S. soft 
power regionally and to a lesser extent globally.  This connection is stronger in regions where relations 
with the United States have historically been strained.  The missions have provided an important tool in 
strengthening security relationships.  Given this fact, coupled with the modest monetary cost of such 
deployments, conducting these proactive humanitarian operations even in a time of budget austerity 
should be prioritized. 
      Chapter three examines a DOD program that employs soft power to counter the use of 
biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Rapid advances in technology have led to unprecedented 
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developments in the life sciences.  While these advances (gene sequencing as an example) are 
extraordinary, they also have the potential to be used for nefarious purposes.  Tougher bio-defense 
measures like greater regulation that carries legal or criminal ramifications may arguably work within the 
borders of one developed country such as the United States, but are unrealistic internationally.  Hard 
power approaches to countering the biological threat in an era of rapid “dual-use” technologies are likely 
to be ineffective as invisible pathogens can easily be spread state-to-state, continent-to-continent, either 
purposefully or accidentally.7  The manner in which the United States responds to such increasing, visibly 
undetectable threats is of growing concern to the security community.  Both the security and scientific 
communities are debating achievable, effective methods to prevent and defend against an actor with the 
knowledge and (easily procurable) equipment to spread a biological pathogen.  Hard power tools such as 
guns, tanks, and airplanes will almost certainly prove ineffective against such a threat.  An international 
inspection regime based on the Biological Weapons Treaty is non-existent primarily because of American 
opposition based on concerns about cost to its own domestic biological research institutions and industry.  
Sanctions are an inadequate tool if no verification mechanism exists to ensure compliance of demanded 
actions.  Even intelligence is limited in a world with thousands of dual-use laboratories and a growing 
desire for more biological advances to fight naturally occurring diseases.   
     This chapter asks the question: does the Department of Defense Cooperative Biological 
Engagement Program‟s (CBEP) soft power approach decrease the likelihood that dual-use biotechnology 
will be used to wage biological warfare or launch bioterror attacks?  Three measures of effectiveness of the 
CBEP in two case studies of one country (Georgia) and one region (Southeast Asia) are examined to 
determine if the engagement produces the outcomes of greater scientific open communication, trust, and 
health and human security, which are said to help counter biological threats.   The research examines the 
links between the CBEP and a host region‟s increase in biosecurity, biosurveillence capability, and 
biological-related partnerships with the United States.  In both case studies, using these three metrics, the 
program demonstrated a positive effect to varying degrees.  Given the limited hard power defense 
solutions and limited diplomatic solutions to countering the broad biological threat, this type of soft power 
program within the DOD may be the most effective and important long term. 
                                                          
                 7 Note: “Dual-use” is defined as materials, equipment, hardware, and knowledge that have peaceful applications can also 
be exploited to produce weapons. 
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Extent to Which Soft Power Makes a Difference in Broader International Security 
      Scholars and policymakers have advocated for the importance of soft power in security strategy 
in a variety of ways.  Former presidential candidate Gary Hart called for the elevation of soft power or 
what he described more broadly as the “power of principles” to be added to the traditional American 
economic, political, and military forms of power.8  Joseph Nye and William Owens argued that the soft 
power in the new information age is a “force multiplier” to engage states in “security dialogues to prevent 
them from becoming hostile.”9  Soft power has been cited as being effective in a range of security related 
issues from countering asymmetric threats to nuclear non-proliferation to the expansion of democratic 
values.  For example, Carol Atkinson advocated for the importance of soft power by arguing that U.S. 
hosted educational exchange programs are effective in spreading liberal democratic values particularly to 
citizens of non-democratic states.10  Numerous think tanks and policy advisors have proposed the 
application of soft power to address asymmetric challenges to national security such as such as control of 
networks for exchange, travel and migration, telecommunications, healthcare delivery, multinational 
cooperation, and cybersecurity.11   
      On the other hand, skeptics of soft power place more emphasis on hard power, including 
economic and military.  Author and strategist, Colin S. Gray argues there are serious limitations to the use 
soft power as an instrument of policy, that its idea has “not been subjected to a sufficiently critical forensic 
examination,” and that it should not be considered an equal when compared with hard military force.12 
Policymakers such Senator John Kyl and Richard Perle warn of the dangers of relying on soft power 
approaches to security particularly in relation to the proliferation of WMD.13  Soft power has also been 
criticized for its lack of measurable effectiveness and even for its “dark side” which can twist “minds in 
resentment and rage” because, regardless of intent, soft power could lead to repulsion rather than 
                                                          
                 8 Gary Hart. The Fourth Power: A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
                 9 Joseph S. Nye Jr. and William Owens. “America‟s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996, 20-36. 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51840/joseph-s-nye-jr-and-william-a-owens/americas-information-edge>. 
                 10 Carol Atkinson. “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980-2006,” Foreign 
Policy Analysis, no. 6, 2010, 1-22. 
                 11 CACI International Inc. and the U.S. Naval Institute. “Employing Smart Power: A Summery of Remarks of Participants 
of the 2009 Symposium - Dealing With Today‟s Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security, Symposium Three: Employing 
Smart Power,” 2009, 9. <http://asymmetricthreat.net/docs/asymmetric_threat_3_paper.pdf >. 
                 12 Colin S. Gray. “Hard Power and Soft Power: the Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st 
Century,” Strategic Studies Institute publication, April 2011, vi. 
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1059.pdf>. 





      However, a growing number of scholars and practitioners have come to agree on the importance 
of the use of “smart power” or the synthesis of both hard and soft power in security policy-making.  These 
advocates argue that the application of both hard and soft power simultaneously may be the only way to 
overcome unconventional threats.15  Numerous security leaders have advocated for this policy balance.  
Former Admiral and NATO commander James Stavridis argued for a hard-soft/public-private balance he 
calls “open source security.”16  Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued for this concept in her 
nomination hearing by stating, “We must use what has been called „smart power‟: the full range of tools at 
our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural – to develop a coherent, 
integrated national strategy to meet the asymmetric threats the nation faces today.”17  At the same time, 
former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, advocated for its use as well when he stated, "I am here to 
make the case for strengthening our capacity to use soft power and for better integrating it with hard 
power."18  This was an unprecedented argument by the leader of America‟s hard power forces for more 
resources to be allocated to diplomacy and development as Gates declared that, “no one could ever recall a 
secretary of defense calling for an increase in the State Department budget.”19  Clearly, many in the 
policymaking realm have embraced the need for soft power approaches to security but there have been 




                                                          
                 14 Joseph Joffe. “The Perils of Soft Power,” New York Times, 14 May 2006. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/14/magazine/14wwln_lede.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 >.    
                 15 CACI International Inc. and the U.S. Naval Institute. “Employing Smart Power,” 2.  
                    Ernest J Wilson III. “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 2008, 113-114. 
                 16 Olga Kahzan. “Interview: NATO Supreme Allied Commander on Syria and Soft Power,” The Atlantic, 9 May 2013. 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/interview-nato-supreme-allied-commander-on-syria-and-soft-
power/275709/ >.  
                    Michael Blanding. “The Power of Soft Power: NATO‟s Former Supreme Commander Brings to the Fletcher School His 
Field Tested Ideas,” Fall 2013. <http://www.tufts.edu/alumni/magazine/fall2013/features/soft-power.html > (3 February 2014). 
                    James Stavridis and Dr. Evelyn Farkas. “21st Century Force Multiplier: Public-Private Collaboration,” Washington 
Quarterly, 53:2, 2012, 7-20. 
                  17 Hillary Clinton. “Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nominee for Secretary of State, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee,” 13 January 2009. <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/ClintonTestimony090113a.pdf>. 
                  18 Donna Miles. “Gates Urges More Emphasis, Funding for All Aspects of National Power,” Armed Forces Press Service, 
26 November 2007. <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=48226 >. 





THE SOFT POWER INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION ON FOREIGN 





      In 2010, the United States Government spent $108 million of federal funds to bring members of 
foreign militaries to the United States to attend approximately 150 U.S. Military institutions and/or receive 
U.S. funded military training.20  This International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program was 
established by Congress in 1976.  The IMET program‟s goal has been to strengthen foreign nations‟ 
militaries through professionalization, and a growth in respect for democratic values and human rights.  
There has always been speculation, however, whether this program actually fosters democratic values in its 
foreign military students, or whether it simply gives advanced military training with no impact on military 
policies.  The program has been criticized for giving training to foreign students who may actually end up 
using that same military training to more efficiently abuse human rights and stifle democratic values. 
      This chapter argues that there are no predictable positive effects on recipient militaries of the 
IMET program.  While unpredictable the effects may be, the value of the IMET program is such that even 
minimally measured effects can be very meaningful.  There is evidence that significant numbers of foreign 
military officers trained in the IMET program do indeed rise to levels of significant power within their 
armed forces.  Evidence suggests that IMET training is a highly desirable military distinction for graduates, 
and therefore, it is not far reaching to assume that these individuals are in a position to influence the 
policies of their militaries.   
      This chapter utilizes three case studies (Ukraine, Nigeria, and Bangladesh) to demonstrate that 
some level of improvement on a recipient military‟s respect for human rights and civilian control can be 
obtained through the IMET program.  While improvements in these areas are inconsistent among case 
studies, accepting the notion that the program has no impact on a recipient military‟s democratic values 
would be narrow and inaccurate.  The value of the IMET program remains part of a larger security 
relationship strategy that has broader positive security impacts.  The relative gains from the IMET 
                                                          
20 U.S. Government Accountability Office. International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human 




program far outweigh the costs; as this chapter will illustrate in later sections, the U.S. Government spends 
only $108 million per year on this program.  This is $50 million less than the production of one single Joint 
Strike Fighter aircraft, the product of another controversial defense program.21  Given the low cost of the 
IMET program and its already established role in developing and maintaining security relationships, even 
small unpredictable progress in democratic values and attitudes in the recipient countries‟ militaries is well 
worth the effort.   
      The chapter first explains the IMET program and its stated goals.  Second, a literature review 
analyzes the possible relationships between U.S. training of foreign militaries and the recipient nation‟s 
military policies.  In assessing the ways in which the IMET Program can potentially foster democratic 
values in foreign militaries, the chapter explores the relative benefits of the program‟s stated mission.  
Third, the soft power influence of the IMET program regarding democratic values is examined through 
three case studies of Ukraine, Nigeria and Bangladesh.  These three studies focus on countries whose 
militaries have little history of democratic values in order to evaluate the theory that the IMET program 
has no effect on these values.  Through this examination, I argue that even though distinct consistent 
progress cannot be seen with regards to the democratic values in the three case studies, even slight 
progress is worth the effort given IMET‟s role in developing security relationships and creating enduring 
partnerships at a very low monetary cost.  The fact that the results are hard to quantify does not mean that 
results aren‟t there.  Even a small sign of progress is worth the pennies the U.S. Government is spending 
to continue this program. 
 
Written and Unwritten Objectives of IMET 
      According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) – the U.S. government agency 
responsible for implementing the program – the stated objectives of the IMET program are the following: 
 To further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military 
relations, which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United 
States and foreign countries; and 
                                                          
21 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter – DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and 




 To increase the ability of foreign national military and civilian personnel to absorb and maintain basic 
democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights.22 
The first objective is widely understood.  In fact, most U.S. military officers think the IMET 
program‟s main goal is to develop military-to-military relationships that will last throughout a foreign 
officer‟s career.  The majority of Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs) (the experts on managing IMET 
and other military assistance programs) think human rights is “not a consideration or priority compared 
with other IMET objectives.”23  Less than half the training plans for IMET participant countries that the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) ranked as “not free” included training objectives dealing with 
civil-military relations, rule of law, or human rights.  The GAO questioned whether the IMET goals of 
promoting democratic values are being met.  The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 
(DISAM) is also currently trying to ascertain whether these goals are being met.  It is possible that the 
stated objective of promoting democratic values has taken a back seat in the past to less overtly stated 
objectives such as managing counterterrorism, leadership training, and developing military relationships. 
However, the ambiguity seems to be disappearing.  A State and Defense Department Study of the 
Effectiveness of the IMET Program: 2007-2009 showed that international students cited improved 
understanding of internationally recognized human rights in surveys of graduates at the time of 
graduation.24  
      DSCA does have language on the topic of democratic values and can be evidenced in two of 
the six official training objectives of the program: 
1. Demonstrate the proper role of the military in a civilian-led democratic government 
2. Foster an understanding of internationally recognized human rights 
Using DSCA‟s own descriptive language around these objectives, it is possible to define the term 
“democratic values” and measure change in two categories: (1) level of civilian control of the military; and 
(2) regard for human rights. 
 
                                                          
22 Defense Security Cooperation Agency. “International Military Education & Training (IMET),” Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency website, <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm> (4 Oct 2012). 
23 U.S. Government Accountability Office. International Military Education and Training: 15. 
24 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. State Department and DISAM Study on the Effectiveness of the IMET 
Program, by Mark Ahles, Michael Rehg, Aaron Prince, and Litsu Rehak, N.p.:, DISAM, 2009, 
<http://www.disam.dsca.mil/documents/itm/sc_training_programs/security_assistance/2007-2009_imet_survey_report.pdf>, 1.  
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Ways the IMET Program Could Influence Democratic Values (Literature Review) 
There are several possible ways the IMET program could have influence on a recipient country‟s 
democratic values.   
Influence of Powerful Alumni 
      John Cope, a Fellow from the Institute for National Strategic Studies, wrote a significant study in 
1995 entitled International Military Education and Training: An Assessment.  It is the most comprehensive work 
outlining the overall effectiveness of IMET with many first-hand accounts based on surveys.  Like many 
of the articles on the IMET program, Cope‟s study tends to focus less on the program‟s influence on 
democratic values and more on the international graduates as rising leaders in their militaries and the ability 
of the United States to then connect to and leverage those leaders when required.   
      There is consensus throughout much of the literature on IMET acknowledging the difficulty of 
quantifying progress/effectiveness with regards to democratic values.  Cope, for example, says success 
with regards to the advancement of human rights can only really be defined after the fact, when human 
rights violations have not occurred.25  However, as foreign military officer graduates further their careers in 
their own respective armed forces, presumably they advance in rank, have more responsibility, and have 
the potential to be the future leaders of their forces.  As leaders of their militaries, they might remember 
the democratic values to which they were exposed while being educated at one of the various institutions 
under the IMET program, and would thus be able to significantly influence their military‟s behavior.   As 
an example, in a review of the effects of security cooperation in Romania by Ira C. Queen, there appeared 
to be a link between U.S. security cooperation with Romania and Romania‟s more pro-Western policies.  
In addition to providing assistance in improving Romania‟s military justice system and inter-ministerial 
cooperation, many Romanian officers attended training through the IMET program and they have IMET 
graduates in over 17 different ministries within their government.  Queen noted that Romania‟s goal has 
not only been to enhance its military‟s capacity to integrate with the U.S.- or NATO-led missions, but also 
to reform its own interagency relations.26  A 2008 George C. Marshall European Center for Security 
                                                          
25 John A. Cope. International Military Education and Training an Assessment (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, National Defense University Press, 1995), 42.  




Studies report showed that its international military educational program produces alumni who (in surveys) 
claim they are able to influence their respective militaries in such ways as improving relations with their 
own country‟s civilian ministries, and developing new versions of military and counter-terrorism laws.27  
Through the use of three case studies, U.S. Air Force Colonel Ruby and Professor Gibler in 2010 attempt 
to show that U.S. Professional Military Education (PME) is a stabilizing force during times of democratic 
transition.  In their case studies, they show that countries used the U.S. PME system as a model to 
encourage civilian control of the military in emerging democracies.   
      Conversely, some reports indicate the influence of the IMET program is marginal at best.  
Jennifer Morrison Taw prepared a report for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1993 regarding 
the training of international military students (specifically training on internal defense and development).  
In it, she argues that the training program is too small to really make an impact because only a small 
percentage of each military‟s personnel receive the training and “powerful historical, political, cultural, and 
economic influences on foreign militaries behavior and development” are much stronger.28  A 2011 GAO 
report on the IMET program looked specifically at IMET‟s impact on a recipient country‟s respect for 
human rights.  The study used countries‟ Freedom House ranking in its assessment, evaluated all the U.S. 
PME curricula, and used numerous interviews to reach its conclusion that human rights training had not 
been emphasized enough in the IMET curricula.  This report did not focus on civilian control of the 
military.  Despite the GAO report and Taw‟s assessment, alumni successfully completing IMET training, 
returning to their country, and subsequently rising through the ranks appears to be the most effective 
means for the program to have a positive influence on democratic values. 
 
Enhancement of Military-to-Military Relationships 
      Another way the program could have a lasting impact is by deepening the military to military 
relationship between the two countries causing increased exposure to the U.S. Military.  As foreign military 
officers are exposed to American exercises and gain contacts and relationships with American military 
                                                          
27 George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Alumni 
Survey Report 1994-2006.  
28 Jennifer Morrison Taw. The Effectiveness of Training International Military Students in Internal Defense and Development (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1993).  
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officers, they might be more likely to influence their own military leadership to be more involved in 
multilateral or bilateral exercises or operations in cooperation with the U.S. Military.  More exposure of 
their forces to American forces would potentially spread democratic values.  Miles Wolpin of the 
University of New Mexico suggests that U.S. military assistance programs such as IMET do have a 
moderate impact on foreign officers‟ ideological thinking.29  His work focused on the political socialization 
of officers from 3rd world countries from 1946-1970.  Wolpin‟s conclusion is drawn by comparing the 
proportion of a nation‟s armed forces trained by the United States with the incidences of ideological 
interventions.  When the proportion of forces exposed to U.S. forces by training and exercising with them 
is larger, Wolpin found that the number of conservative coups is higher than the number of radical coups.  
Wolpin studied cases during the cold war and did not discuss a military‟s behavior regarding democratic 
values.  Conservative versus radical coups were defined by nothing more than the way in which the foreign 
military or future government leaned (east or west) for future partnership following the takeover.  There 
are numerous articles from DISAM Journal touting the positive benefits of the program, the majority of 
which emphasize the increased military-to-military relationships resulting from the training.  The majority 
of this literature expresses the impact of the program at solidifying global relationships and increasing the 
interoperability of working with the same equipment rather than the expansion of democratic values.  
These articles also appear in a journal that is published by DSCA, the agency responsible for the 
implementation of the IMET program itself.  While both DISAM and DSCA‟s journals provide admirable 
studies of the IMET program itself, both agencies‟ interest in the continuation of IMET casts doubt on 
the neutrality and objectivity of their studies.  However, the number of countries with whom the U.S. has 
participated in military-to-military exercises has increased since the beginning of the IMET program.   
  One can postulate that there is a certain amount of prestige that graduates receive as a result of 
completing the program.  For example, Rear Admiral Kazi Sarwar Hossain of the Bangladesh Coast Guard 
is pictured in uniform in a publication of distinguished graduates of the U.S. Naval War College with his 
U.S. Navy SEAL trident prominently displayed on his chest, suggesting the value that he places on his 
                                                          
29 Miles D. Wolpin. "External Political Socialization as a Source of Conservative Military Behavior in the Third 
World," Studies in Comparative International Development 8, no.1 (1973): 3-23.  
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American training and the prestige that he receives from this training.30  It is likely these IMET graduates 
are eager to reconnect on a professional level with the country that educated and trained them. 
 
IMET used as a Foreign Policy Tool 
      Amongst the volumes of case studies touting IMET as a positive national security tool, still a few 
individuals claim IMET in fact has a negative impact.   Most cite as examples the School of the Americas, 
which critics claim was a training ground for El Salvador‟s military officers to become more efficient 
abusers of human rights in the early 1990s or more recently the fact that some Indonesian military officers 
are trained in the U.S.  The Indonesian military helped to inflict a campaign of terror and violence in East 
Timor in 1999.31  The argument, although not written in a scholarly journal, is that the United States 
should not be associated with oppressive militaries.32  In 2000, when the Indonesian military controversy 
was taking place, CQ Weekly reported that at that time, scholars of civil-military relations said there has 
been no academic study investigating how these types of education programs affect alumni behavior.33  
This argument has spurred the program to be used as a foreign policy tool.  If a receiving country does not 
meet a minimum standard outlined by the Leahy Law, which prohibits any foreign assistance such as 
IMET funds to go to a country where there is credible evidence of gross human rights violations to which 
its government is not adequately responding, threatened withdrawal of IMET funds could occur.34  If a 
receiving country‟s military is grossly disregarding human rights, the United States could stop inviting their 
military students to be educated under the program.  In the early 1990s, Congress cut off IMET funding to 
Indonesia due to that country‟s human rights record.  Some funding was restored in 1995 but then cut off 
again in 2000 after more reports of human rights violations.35  However, the effectiveness of the IMET 
                                                          
30 United States  Naval War College. "United States Naval War College Distinguished Alumni 2012-13." (Newport, R.I.: 
USNWC, 2012), <http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/97ddf893-bf7e-4117-a487-7fc2c0f4b380/Distinguished-Alumni>, (1 Nov 
2012).  
31 Brad Simpson, ed. "A Quarter Century of U.S. Support for Occupation in East Timor: National Security Archive 
Briefing Book No. 174: 28 Nov 2005,” National Security Archive, 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/index.htm>. 
32 Benjamin Schwartz. "'Values' Fall on Deaf Ears," Los Angeles Times (14 Sept. 1999), 
<http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/14/local/me-9985>. 
33 Miles A. Pomper. “Foreign Affairs: Battle Lines Keep Shifting Over Foreign Military Training,” CQ Weekly (29 Jan 
2000), <http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport106-000000027971>, 193-96. 
34 United States Government. "Overview of the Leahy Law," U.S. Government humanrights.gov website, 
<http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/10/06/an-overview-of-the-leahy-vetting-process/>, (20 Oct 2012). 
35 Lora Lumpe. Special Report: U.S. Foreign Military Training. Foreign Policy in Focus. (N.p.:Interhemispheric Resource Center 
and the Institute for Policy Studies, May 2002), <http://www.fpif.org>. 
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program used as a foreign policy tool is the least productive area of influence.  Expelling foreign students 
of an offending military/government from the IMET program removes the potential for changing its 
military for the better.  Furthermore, expulsion from IMET has historically been inconsistently applied 
making it an ineffective tool for change.  
 
Other Factors Influencing a Foreign Military’s Democratic Values 
      Broadly speaking, there are many factors that might impact a foreign military‟s behavior with 
regards to democratic values.  The strength of a foreign country‟s central government is likely to influence 
the extent to which that government‟s civilian leaders control the military.  In addition, civilian control of 
the military is often dependent upon perceived external threats. Richard Kohn argues that an internal or 
external crisis “can produce disorder or chaos at such a level as to invite military rule, as occurred in many 
newly-independent nations in Africa and Asia in the wake of decolonization after World War II.”36  
International political pressure for involvement in multinational military operations from outside the 
country itself can influence change in particular foreign military‟s behavior.  Moreover, exposure to the 
U.S. Military in exercises through security cooperation can foster an increase in democratic behavior.  
Stephen Rosen addresses the connection between a country‟s military and its internal domestic social 
structures by concluding that internal societies have much influence on military behavior and military 
power.37  The existing laws of a country, such as its constitution (or lack of a constitution) could also have 
an influence. 
 
Methodology of Research 
      The link between IMET and a foreign military‟s progress in democratic values is explored by 
looking at three militaries as case studies.  As Figures 1 and 2 show, these three countries from different 
                                                          
36 Richard H. Kohn. "An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military: Mar 1997," American Diplomacy website, University 
of North Carolina, <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html>. 
37 Stephen P. Rosen. "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, 19, no. 4 (1995): 5-31.  
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regions – Ukraine, Nigeria, and Bangladesh – have approximately the same size military, and all have 
approximately the same number of military members taking part in the U.S. IMET program in FY 2010. 
Figure 1: Size Comparison of Case Study Armed Forces 
 
Source: (2011): The Military Balance  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2011.559826> 
 
Figure 2: IMET Students per year (1999-2010) 
 
Source: U.S. Department of State Reports to Congress on Foreign Military Training 2000-2011 
<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/index.htm> 
 
      Countries that have a higher amount of IMET funding rather than a lower amount were chosen 
in order to maximize the likelihood of discernible impact.  Figure 3 shows the IMET funding levels for the 
three case study countries over the past ten years.  The average money the United States spent on the 

























top 30 countries out of 125 receiving funding in 2010 (top 25%).  This is much higher than the average as 
Figure 3 shows. 
Figure 3: IMET Funding per year (1999-2010) in U.S. Dollars 
 
Source: U.S. Department of State Reports to Congress on Foreign Military Training 2000-2011 
<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/index.htm> 
 
      These three case study countries – which are considered “partly free” according to the Freedom 
House rankings for 2010 – were chosen in order to be able to identify some improvement during the 
researched years, as contrasted to countries that are considered “free” whose militaries are more likely to 
have already ingrained democratic values.  Similarly, countries considered “not free” whose militaries are 
more likely to have shown no improvement, would not enable this study to identify progress.  Progress in 
democratic values was analyzed from 1990 to present due to the fact that it was at the end of the cold war 
in 1990 that Congress expanded the stated goals of the program to include the enhancement of democratic 
values such as human rights and civilian control of the military.38   
      Democratic values were measured by IMET‟s own stated goals, the enhancement of human 
rights and the enhancement of the level of civilian control of the military.  For each case study, evidence of 
progress in the democratic values of a foreign military was explored by looking specifically at the country‟s 
civil-military relations and its military‟s human rights record over time.  Civilian-military relations were 
researched using scholarly journal articles and books on each country.  Evidence of human rights was 
explored by reading language in Department of State and independent human rights reports over the years 
                                                          















in question and looking specifically at language dealing with military behavior.  In addition, human rights 
research employed media reports and articles from scholarly journals.  As evidence of progress appeared, 
the potential link to the IMET program was examined.  It should be noted that the enhancement of 
respect for rule of law is a democratic value that is also a part of IMET‟s stated goals.  However, this 
research focuses on those values that can be more easily applicable to and measurable in military behavior.  
The enhancement of rule of law applies mostly to civilian institutions.  Therefore, civilian control of the 
military and a military‟s respect for human rights are the two values of measure for this research.  
      IMET‟s potential influence is established by focusing on three processes in which the program 
could impact that military‟s democratic values (through alumni, increasing military-to-military relationships, 
and IMET used as a foreign policy tool).  Determining alumni in positions of power is challenging.  To 
begin, there is no comprehensive list of IMET graduates.  To identify alumni who are in a position to 
influence their respective countries‟ militaries in the three countries discussed, a search was conducted in 
order to identify distinguished graduates of the various U.S. military educational institutions.  However, 
not all U.S. PME institutions have such lists.  Therefore, graduates were found by looking at the 
biographies of high-ranking military and civilian leadership within the countries researched available 
online.   
      The military-to-military relationship with the United States was evaluated by looking at the major 
operations the countries participated in along with the United States in the past twenty years.  In addition, 
training exercises involving the countries in question with the United States over the past five years were 
discovered by using open source press releases from U.S. embassies and various media reports.   
      The source information for IMET being used as a foreign policy tool came from looking at 
funding levels for all security assistance programs for the case study countries for the past twenty years and 






Limitations of the Research 
      Research was limited due to a lack of measurable data in many areas.  There was neither a 
comprehensive U.S. Government list provided as to the names of IMET alumni, nor was there a list from 
all institutions as to their own foreign military graduates of distinction.  There is no published data 
following-up on the activities/careers of international graduates.  Prior to 1999, when the State 
Department was required to submit a report to Congress on foreign military training, data as to the 
numbers of students and funding levels of different programs was inconsistent.  Other military security 
assistance training programs are often in place independent of IMET, making it hard to isolate the IMET 
program‟s impact from the larger security assistance picture.   
 
Findings 
      Most of the literature written on this topic indicated that even though one of the written goals of 
the program was to foster democratic values, the program was not seen by its international students or by 
American military officers as having the goal of furthering these values.  Based on this fact and the fact 
that the GAO report recommended more formal human rights training placed into the curriculum, a likely 
hypothesis would be that the IMET program would show no positive effect on furthering a foreign 
military‟s democratic values.  One might conclude that the training and education of foreign military 
officers isn‟t worth the U.S. taxpayer money if no progress could be found in this area or democratic 
values.  However, the IMET program‟s value lies not just in its potential to further democratic values but 
also as part of a larger global security cooperation strategy.  Furthermore, upon detailed examination, some 
links between the IMET program and the advancement of democratic values were reasonably discovered 
in all the countries selected for case study.  There are alumni who are now in the top positions in their 
militaries and they maintain contact with the United States through military training and exercises.  
Expressions of the value of their IMET training continue to be evident in the consistency in which they 
cite their IMET training in biographical material and they physically display their qualifications earned in 
the United States.  Progress in democratic values in the case study countries still remained inconsistent and 
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unpredictable.  However, given the low cost of the IMET program for the United States, even small, 
unpredictable data based progress is worth the effort. 
 
Case Study 1: Ukraine 
Background on Ukrainian Military and History with IMET  
       For most of the 20th century, the Ukrainian territory was part of the Soviet Union.  The Soviet 
military had a large presence in the area and when Ukraine became an independent state, it inherited a very 
large portion of the former Soviet armed forces.  In 1992, when the Ukrainian military institution had just 
come into existence, officers with no democratic history populated the large, “over manned” force.39   
Ukraine started from scratch in developing a framework for democratic civilian control of the military.  A 
bloated military at the start of a new democracy could have been cause for concern.  However, the Soviet 
legacy left Ukraine‟s military with little “lust for power”. 40  Ukraine was able to develop a framework for 
solidifying civilian control of the military primarily through the Ukrainian Constitution.41  According to the 
Ukrainian Constitution, the Parliament or “Verkhovna Rada” has oversight of the military.  It formulates 
legislation and the legal basis for military policy.  It also controls the military‟s budget.  The constitution 
stipulates that the President of Ukraine serves as the supreme commander in chief of the armed forces.  
Serving military officers are prohibited from being president.42  The National Security and Defense 
Council controls all major military decisions.  The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is responsible for the 
condition and development of the armed forces.  This MOD is subordinate to and appointed by the 
President.43   
                                                          
39 Anatoliy Grytsenko. "Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: On the Way from Form to Substance," NATO Fellowship 
Program Working Paper (Kyiv: 2000): 6.  
40 James Sherr. "Security, Democracy and Civil Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Ukraine," Conflict Studies Research 
Centre (Jan 2001): 16.  
41 Natalie Mychajlyszyn. "Civil-Military Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Implications for Domestic and Regional 
Stability," Armed Forces & Society Spring 28, no. 3 (2002): 455-79.  
42 Natalie Mychajlyszyn and Harald Von Riekhoff. The Evolution of Civil-military Relations in East-Central Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 197.  
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      Today the Ukrainian military consists of 130,000 regular members and 85,000 paramilitary also 
called “security service” members.44  The “security service” is an internal force that could be mobilized for 
international conflict if necessary but has a primary function of homeland policing.  These forces are 
separate from the regular or external forces whose primary mission is external conflict.  Ukraine started 
receiving IMET funds for military training almost immediately after its independence.  In the mid-90s, the 
IMET program was considered its primary U.S. security assistance program.45  The U.S. trained 66 
Ukrainian students under IMET in 2010 and 2,522 since Ukraine‟s independence in 1991.46  Based on this 
strong presence of Ukraine in the IMET program, one would predict that if any progress in a military‟s 
respect for democratic values could be linked to the IMET program, Ukraine would be a good candidate.  
 
Civilian Control of the Military in Ukraine 
      Between 1991-2000, the Verkhovna Rada adopted 125 laws regarding Ukraine‟s national 
security system, and as a result, the armed forces underwent serious reform by becoming more transparent.  
The legal framework concerning the Armed forces had been strengthened.  However, there remains 
concern that Ukraine‟s internal troops do not fall under the same framework of civilian control.47  The 
absence of democratic control over Ukraine‟s internal security forces (33,000 internal troops) has remained 
unchanged since the early 1990s.48  Even though a constitutional framework exists (as described earlier), 
there have been reports of a declining role of Parliament in defense and military issues.  At the same time, 
there was evidence of a tense relationship between the MOD and military general staff.49  A lack of 
understanding of democratic civil-military relations by the highest-ranking officers continues.  Key 
positions within the MOD are still held by military members or retired military members.  The military still 
                                                          
44 International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance: Chapter Four: Europe (London: IISS, 2012), 
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views the civilians in government as being inadequate and unable to set defense policy.50  Efforts to 
improve oversight of the military by Parliament have been resisted by the military.51   
      There is recognition that much remains to be done to improve Ukraine‟s level of civil-military 
relations.  However, the trends of democratizing the military, particularly the external forces, have been 
“steady and positive.”52  This consistent positive trend has continued in line with the U.S. education of 
Ukrainian military officers through IMET.  There is evidence that Ukrainian IMET graduates have 
become reform-minded leaders within the Ukrainian national security bureaucracy.  Some have assumed 
key positions.  In 2007, the defense minister started to recognize the diplomas Ukrainian servicemen 
earned in the U.S. and was “personally interviewing returning students from abroad in order to 
recommend their appropriate placement in the forces so as to leverage their education and experience.”53  
Anatoliy Gritsenko, a graduate of the U.S. Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, served as the 
Defense Minister of Ukraine from 2005-2007 and was considered one of the few “non corrupt” and “pro 
western” Ukrainian politicians.54  His research while studying abroad focused on democratic civilian 
control of the armed forces “pioneering this research in Ukraine.”55   Later, while serving in the Ukrainian 
Parliament as Chairman of the National Security and Defense Committee, he actively pushed for anti-
corruption reform especially within the Ukrainian army.  By the end of 2011, 290 IMET-trained Ukrainian 
officers served on staff at the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, or service staffs and more of the current 
military senior leadership is thought to support reform.56  In general, Ukraine has brought more civilian 
experts to the Ministry of Defense and has supported increasing the amounts of training of Ukrainian 
officers receive in the West.  The IMET program has provided master`s-degree level education in civil-
military relations to numerous current and future senior Ukrainian military leaders.   
      Despite this, there are less-positive trends such as reports that the internal “Security Service” of 
Ukraine at times “acted with impunity and appeared to act to further the political interests of the 
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President.”57  This could be due to the two-tiered structure in the Ukrainian armed forces described earlier.  
Leaders in the external forces typically are chosen for IMET training and therefore, large numbers of 
senior leaders primarily from the internal forces still have little exposure to the West.  The non-
transparency and perhaps the more politicized arm of the internal armed forces are considered a 
consequence of this lack of exposure to Western training.  Anatoliy Gritsenko, the IMET graduate 
referred to earlier, has been openly critical of the “politicization” of these forces and their harassment of 
Presidential political opponents.58   
 
Respect for Human Rights by Ukraine’s Military 
      There does seem to be some progress within the Ukrainian Military in respect for human rights.  
The U.S. Department of State‟s 1999 Human Rights report for Ukraine indicated that the military had 
some role in politically motivated killings, and partook in the torture of prisoners to death.  The report 
noted that the military‟s “pervasive corruption” and connections between it and organized crime networks 
“blurs” the distinction as to who specifically committed the attacks on “politicians, politically connected 
businessmen, and journalists.”59  By 2011, however, there were no reports that the government or its 
agents committed any politically motivated killings or disappearances.  In 1999, there were reports of 
beatings of conscripts in the army by fellow soldiers.  In that same year, these army beatings resulted in 30-
40 deaths.  These types of beatings were recorded for the next five years.  In 2005, it was noted that there 
was increased accountability of the armed forces.  The violent beatings of conscripts still occurred, but by 
2005 there were no reported deaths as a result of these beatings.  Since 2008, there have not been any 
reports of these violent beatings.  The beatings of recruits were a tradition handed-down from the Soviet 
military.   
      Since Ukrainian independence, its military has been involved in various multinational operations 
and exercises.  The military has been an active participant in NATO‟s Partnership for Peace exercises.  It 
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has played a role in NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Kosovo, and in UN 
Peacekeeping missions in Congo, Liberia, Sudan, and Ivory Coast.  In the 2002 Prague Summit, the official 
NATO-Ukraine Partnership Action Plan was adopted.  This plan urged Ukraine to focus its reform efforts 
on “strengthening democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the market economy.”60  In 2003-2005, 
Ukraine deployed 1,600 Ukrainian peacekeepers to Iraq.  It has also cooperated in the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.61  Such exposure via partnerships 
with Western armed forces in exercises and operations, and via military leadership being trained in the 
United States is likely to have played a part in stopping the inhumane practices of beatings and killings that 
characterized the military prior to the training experience.  Moreover, the Defense Minister from 2005 to 
2007 – when the beatings of recruits appears to have stopped – was an IMET graduate; an important 
distinction to make within the context of this study.  The issue of hazing in the military is stressed during 
IMET courses and likely influenced the graduates who held positions of authority.62    
      The practice of military-to-military relationship building has continued and expanded.  For 
example, the U.S. and Ukraine began a strategic partnership in 2008 holding its first partnership meeting in 
2009.63  Exercises between the two countries are not uncommon.  Some 1,400 armed forces personnel 
took part in the two-week Ukrainian-U.S. Rapid Trident military exercise in 2012 at the International 
Peacekeeping and Security Center in the Lviv region.64 
      Despite these strides, Ukraine‟s human rights record still remains poor.  Even though its 
constitution prohibits torture, there were reports that security forces tortured and beat detainees and 
prisoners.  The government generally still fails to prosecute the forces that commit these abuses, especially 
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against ethnic minorities and prisoners.65  However, there has been some modest demonstrated progress in 
its armed forces respect for human rights in the past twenty years since Ukrainian independence.   
 
Ukrainian Case Study Conclusion 
      Despite the fact that Ukraine is only twenty years old, it has one of the more extensive 
experiences with the IMET program.  There has been a strong consistent presence of Ukrainian students 
graduating from the IMET program.  Ukrainian IMET students are not only military officers but also 
senior officials from the Ministries of Defense, Economics, and Border Troops.66  The Ukrainian military 
has shown some modest progress in both civilian-military relations and human rights, and its ministries 
that have utilized Western expertise have reformed more quickly.67  Alumni from the IMET program have 
facilitated this reform. 
 
Case Study 2: Nigeria 
Background on Nigerian Military and History with IMET 
      The Nigerian Military first inserted itself into Nigeria‟s government and politics in 1966, 
following the collapse of the Nigerian “First Republic” government.  From 1966 to 1979, the country was 
ruled by its military.  A brief four-year period of civilian rule in the “Second Republic” took place between 
1979-1983.  In 1984, a military coup led by General Ibrahim Babangida, a graduate of the U.S. Army 
Armored Officer Course and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in California, ousted the democratic 
regime.  Nigeria had various military dictators until 1999 when it held democratic elections in which the 
former military head, Olusegun Obasanjo, was elected the new President.  Nigeria has had three presidents 
since 1999. 
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      Nigeria‟s current military – consisting of 80,000 regular and 82,000 paramilitary troops – has 
many problems.68  Its equipment is very old, its units seldom train, and when they do, training tends to be 
provided by a wide variety of countries and organizations with different doctrines and varying values.  In 
addition, Nigeria has been receiving IMET funding inconsistently for the past 20 years, as opposed to a 
strong consistent program like the Ukraine.  The United States trained 73 Nigerian students in 2010 and 
1,449 since the program began.69  Due to the inconsistent participation of the Nigerian forces to IMET 
training, one would suspect to find little or no progress in the enhancement of democratic values.  
 
 
Civilian Control of the Military in Nigeria 
      The military is widely seen as “the only institution capable of solving the country‟s many 
political, economic and social problems,”70 and thus, the army holds a great deal of political power.   
Military generals remain some of Nigeria‟s most popular political figures.71   The military seems to have the 
mentality that they are not bound by the same rules as ordinary citizens.  Military officers enjoy a higher 
social status both within and outside of the military.72  In addition, for many years since the end of military 
rule, the Nigerian military had repeatedly intervened in the political process of its own country.  However, 
there does seem to be some sign of progress in the Nigerian Military‟s attitude towards the democratic 
values.  Since Obasanjo‟s administration, Nigeria has had two more Presidents – neither of which have 
come from the military.   
      An orderly reorganization within the armed forces has been instituted allowing high-ranking 
positions to experience systematic turnover.73  Other concrete progressive steps taken are the seizure of 
selected officers‟ corruptly acquired money and landed properties.  President Obasanjo has made new 
appointments in key defense positions as part of his administration‟s overall plan to assert effective civilian 
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control over the military.74  Even though Nigeria lost almost a decade of training due to sanctions, some 
alumni have risen in the ranks and have impacted their country‟s civil-military relations.  General Martin 
Luther Agawai, a graduate of the National Defense University in Washington D.C. and U.S. Army Armor 
School became Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Armed Forces from 2006-2009.  IMET graduates have 
continued to rise to the top of their nation‟s armed forces.  The Chief of Defense Staff, Air Chief Marshal 
Paul Dike trained in the United States for the Undergraduate Pilot Training.  He went back for the 
Instructor Pilot Training in Texas and is a graduate of the U.S. Air Command and Staff College in 
Alabama.  Under their leadership, the Nigerian military refused to get involved in the April 2007 
elections.75  This is significant, given the history of the Nigerian military‟s political involvement in the past.  
 
Nigerian Military’s Respect for Human Rights 
      Since 1995, the Nigerian military has deployed as peacekeepers in Liberia (1997), Ivory 
Coast (1997–1999), Sierra Leone (1997–1999), and in Sudan's Darfur region (2007-present).  During this 
timeframe, there was widespread evidence of serious human rights abuses by the Nigerian military 
peacekeepers.  The Nigerian forces were accused of “failing to do enough to minimize civilian casualties 
when carrying out operations, of abusing human rights, and of establishing and running criminal 
networks."76  In Liberia, they “targeted women . . . and committed sexual and gender based violations 
against them including, rape of all forms, sexual slavery, forced marriages, [and] forced recruitment.”77  In 
Sierra Leone, the Nigerian peacekeepers “raped women and girls, forcibly enlisted boys and youths, and 
murdered and mutilated non-combatants at random”.78  More crimes included the looting of private 
property, the execution of enemy fighters and their alleged civilian supporters, and the unlawful detention 
of combatants and non-combatants.79  Evidence exists that the military used excessive, sometimes lethal, 
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force against its own citizens as well.80  In the Ogoniland area of Nigeria from 1990-1999, The Nigerian 
forces committed gross sexual violence sending “a message of utmost fear and insecurity.”81 
 
      The Nigerian military still seems to be using violence against its own people.  Political or 
religious riots are put down by the Nigerian Military since the civilian police force is inadequate and the 
methods used to quell the demonstrations have been violent.  In 2001, in the city of Jos, around 1,000 
people died in demonstrations that brought about clashes with the Nigerian security forces.  In 2004, more 
than 700 people were killed in riots in Yelwa.  Again in Jos in 2008, hundreds more civilians were killed by 
the Nigerian military and security forces.82  There is still great tension between the military and civilians in 
Nigeria. The military often is perceived with “images of terror in the minds of the civil populace.”83  In 
2008 in Bauchi city, an Army Captain ordered his men to brutalize a female civilian by beating her and 
tearing off her clothes.  One woman was beaten, dragged on a road and eventually stripped naked in public 
by naval forces for allegedly obstructing Rear Admiral Harry Arogundade‟s convoy.  The Admiral 
apparently watched the event without stopping it.  Naval authorities publicly contended that the woman 
„„provoked the Naval Ratings and deserved what she got.‟‟84  In the 1980s-90s, the average rating for 
Nigeria on the Political Terror Scale was a 2-3.  It has since worsened since the mid 1990s to an average of 
3-4.85 
      As evidenced in the above data, progress in the area of respect for human rights remains bleak.  
According to the U.S. Department of State, the Nigerian government continues to commit numerous 
arbitrary and unlawful killings.  During 2011, a Joint Task Force (including the Nigerian military and 
security services) “conducted raids on militant groups in the Niger delta resulting in numerous deaths and 
injuries to civilians.”  Also in the report, the Nigerian military was said to have conducted “illegal killings”.  
In addition, the military “destroyed property, illegally detained residents, raped women” and conducted 
“executions”.86  Torture is still not criminalized and the military regularly engages in torture of 
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demonstrators, criminal suspects, and detainees.87  “Authorities have still not prosecuted members of the 
police and military for unlawful killings.”88  In 2012, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy 
Human Rights & Labor, Michael Posner, urged Nigerian forces to be disciplined in their use of force and 
to abstain from violence against civilians.89  However, as this evidence has illustrated, not much has 
changed in the Nigerian military‟s behavior.   
      Despite overwhelming reports of atrocities, there does seem to be “a growing determination 
among Nigeria‟s most senior officers to push ahead with the professionalization” of Nigeria‟s Army, Navy 
and Air Force.90  Officers are starting to push for the improvement in the conduct of the men and women 
under their command.  There is recognition that “the abuses of civilians that have occurred in the past, 
both at home and on peacekeeping missions abroad, have hindered and undermined the military‟s efforts 
to restore or maintain peace.”91  This push toward more respect for human rights by Nigeria‟s military has 
been motivated by both the need to achieve operational effectiveness and improve its international 
reputation.92  International reputation is important especially when it comes to participating in exercises 
with the U.S. military.  The recent Exercise Africa Endeavor in 2008 highlighted the current Chief of Staff 
of the Nigerian Armed Forces and graduate of the Defense intelligence College in Washington D.C., 
General Owoye Andrew Azazi.  General Azazi is pictured in numerous government and media reports 
along with U.S. Military leaders as overseeing the exercise in which both the U.S. and Nigeria participated 
along with other African nations.93  This exercise occurred again in 2012.  Despite more recent efforts, it is 
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IMET Used as a Foreign Policy Tool in Nigeria 
      The inconsistency of IMET training occurred in two instances in which there was flagrant 
disregard for human rights and democratic values by the Nigerian government.  The withholding of 
funding is a well-known foreign policy tool.  The idea behind doing so in these cases was to show 
displeasure for bad behavior on the part of the Nigerian Government, and to encourage human rights and 
democracy.  For example, the Clinton Administration responded to the Nigerian dictator General 
Babangida's annulment of the June 1993 presidential elections by terminating Nigeria's $450,000 
IMET funding and expelling the five Nigerian Military officers receiving military training at the time.  
IMET was again suspended from 2003-2006 because the former Liberian president Charles Taylor, who 
was accused of war crimes, went into exile in Nigeria.  Funding was restored when Nigeria extradited him 
in 2006.  The use of suspending IMET funding as a foreign policy tool may be effective in achieving the 
short-term human rights/democracy goals (such as the extradition of a single human rights offender).  
However, stopping the training of the Nigerian forces lessens the chance that IMET can help improve 
their forces with respect democratic values.  By losing a decade of training due to these measures, it should 
come as no surprise that there is little progress. 
 
 
Nigerian Case Study Conclusion 
      Nigeria has shown some progress in civilian control of the military and former IMET graduates 
have been a significant part of that progress.  However, Nigerian forces have shown little to no progress in 
human rights.  Withholding IMET funding and activity for significant periods of time within the last two 
decades cannot be exclusively cited as the reason for no progress in the area of human rights.  Multiple 
variables were likely operative.  However, training on democratic principles like that obtained by Nigerian 
officers in the IMET program, has the potential to be passed on to their forces.94 
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Case Study 3: Bangladesh 
Background on Bangladeshi Military and History with IMET 
      Since Bangladesh declared its independence from Pakistan in 1971, it has undergone numerous 
military coups and years of military rule.  For much of Bangladesh‟s history, the failure of democratic 
politics to gain a firm hold in the country and the “lofty political ambitions of high ranking [military] 
officers” allowed militarism in government to become normal.95  For many years, “groups within the 
armed forces did not trust any politicians.”96  The military‟s interests were upheld at the expense of other 
forces in society.  Several serving and retired military officers were commonly placed in strategic positions 
in civil and police administration, and public enterprises.97  The last period of military rule ended in 1990 
and since then it has been a parliamentary democracy.  
      The Bangladesh military today consists of 157,000 regular forces with 64,000 paramilitary 
members.98  Bangladesh has inherited influence both from the British Indian Army training system, and 
the Pakistan Army training system, which is not strong in professional or general liberal arts education.  
The United States trained 56 Bangladesh students in 2010 and 1,667 since the start of the IMET program.  
Given the historical precedent of military rule in Bangladesh and the consistent presence of Bangladesh in 
the IMET program, some progress in the Bangladeshi military‟s respect for democratic values should be 
able to be traced back to this training.   
 
Civilian Control of the Military in Bangladesh 
      Although there is room for improvement, Bangladesh has shown some positive trends in civil-
military relations.  It has had civilian rule since 1990.  Critics will say that members of the military are still 
too involved in Bangladesh‟s politics, citing that in 2001, competition between the political parties to 
recruit former army officers as election candidates saw four former army chiefs, one former head of the air 
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force, six former generals and 16 army officers run for parliament.99   However, even the United States has 
had its share of former generals running for political office after their time in the armed forces.  The more 
concerning possible regression of civilian control of the military took place in 2007.   Early that year, the 
scheduled elections were cancelled and emergency law was declared following widespread political unrest.  
The army was instrumental in the cancellation of elections and the establishment of a caretaker 
government or “CG”.  There are those who postulate that a CG backed by the military was the best way to 
dispel the extensive corruption, disorder and political violence in the country.  The military did assist the 
CG in its drive against corruption, and Bangladesh's position in Transparency International's Corruption 
Perceptions Index improved from being at the very bottom, where they had been for three years in a row, 
to 147th in just one year.100  Although the corruption index moved from 162 to 147, many people in 
Bangladesh see the Army‟s role in the government turnover as dangerous.  People there felt that from that 
point on, the army has been given “a kind of knowledge that can never be revoked – the certainty that it 
can step forward and take control” when it deems the government and people incapable of governing.101  
Many in Bangladesh fear that the civilian “grip on democracy will always be tenuous.”102  While this 
government did seem to root out corruption, from the point of view of civilian control of the military, one 
could view the establishment of the CG as regressive.  However, for the past twenty years there has not 
been an outright military takeover of the civilian government, a significant change from the years 
preceding.  During this same time period, Bangladesh has had significant participation in the IMET 
program.  It also participated in the American-led coalition during the 1991 Gulf War to liberate Kuwait 
by contributing 2,300 troops to the operation.  Bangladesh‟s military has become significantly more 
professionalized during this time.  Many of its armed forces leaders were IMET graduates with ties still to 
the U.S. Military.  For example, Vice Admiral Zahir Uddin Ahmed, the current Chief of Naval Staff (head 
of the navy), is pictured as a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island where 
he graduated in 1992.103   
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      Bangladesh has continually increased its partnership and participation in regional exercises and 
operations.  For example, a 2009 U.S. Embassy press release indicated the U.S.-Bangladeshi exercise 
“Tiger Shark” took place in order to train together for counterterrorism, combating piracy, maritime, and 
coastal threats.104  In 2012, disaster assistance exercises included the navy-navy CARAT (Cooperation 
Afloat Readiness and Training) maritime security exercise and DREE (Disaster Response Exercise and 
Exchange) by the U.S. Army Pacific and U.S. Air Force.105  Recently, Admiral Locklear, U.S. commander 
in the pacific region stated “the United States, Bangladesh and other regional neighbors all stand to benefit 
from a strong U.S.-Bangladeshi military-to-military relationship.”106  Assigning "a very good grade" to the 
military-to-military relationship between the United States and Bangladesh, Admiral Locklear said he 
would like to build on it to become stronger partners in ensuring a positive security environment.  All of 
this advancement in the strategic partnership between the U.S. and Bangladesh is likely to have been an 
important factor in encouraging the Bangladesh Military‟s commitment to constitutional rule and 
discouraging any military coup attempts as seen in the past.  The alumni rising to the top of the 
Bangladesh military and the subsequent military-to-military connections have likely aided in the military of 
Bangladesh‟s more moderate stance.   
 
Bangladeshi Military’s Respect for Human Rights 
      In the past ten years, there has been inconsistent progress in the Bangladesh Military‟s respect 
for human rights.  In 2004, an elite force called the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) was established.  The 
RAB, composed of members of the military and police forces, are assigned from their parent 
organizations, to which they return after serving with the unit.  However, according to international 
human rights groups, the RAB has been involved in human rights abuses since its development.107  
Human Rights Watch and others have long documented extrajudicial killings and torture by the RAB.  In 
private, some officials admit that they are aware that RAB engages in human rights violations but that the 
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government is afraid to confront it because this would anger the army.  “There is an obvious culture of 
fear within the government when it comes to confronting [the] RAB on any issue.”108  “The most 
significant human rights problems were killings and torture by security forces.”109  The government did 
not take comprehensive measures to investigate cases of these security force killings.  
      The percentages of high-ranking officers in Bangladesh‟s army who are IMET graduates during 
this time period cannot be found.  However, through the investigative efforts described earlier, it is clear 
that many rose to top leadership positions.  Still, no documented progress in the army‟s behavior with 
regard to the RAB could be found.  In the 2003 Department of State Human Rights Report, the army used 
“unwarranted lethal force” in Operation Clean Heart.110  In this operation, the army was accused of 
assaulting, torturing and killing a man.  In 2006, security forces were considered to “act with impunity and 
commit acts of physical and psychological torture.”  The RAB used unwarranted force killing 355 people.  
No member of the RAB has been prosecuted.  In 2009, after the return of a democratically elected 
government and the repeal of the state of emergency, there was a slight increase in the number of 
extrajudicial killings by security forces.  In 2011, human rights reports still showed numerous killings and 
torture by security forces and a lack of investigations into the killings.   
      Today, the Bangladeshi Army does have an IMET graduate in charge.  Army Chief General Iqbal 
Karim Bhuiyan is a graduate of the peacekeeping course (Defense Institute for International Legal Studies) 
in Rhode Island, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  
Although steps have been taken to rein in the RAB – such as the development of an internal investigation 
unit to hold members accountable for respecting human rights – not much human rights progress can be 
seen in this area to date.111   
      At the same time, the army manages the Bangladesh Institute Peace Keeping Operations and 
Training (BIPSOT) Center, which is considered a world-class training center and the Bangladesh army has 
become a world leader in peacekeeping operations.  Bangladesh fields the world's largest contributor 
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(10,736) to UN peacekeeping forces.  This has given the country‟s military much prestige.  In the past 
decade, Bangladesh had major deployments in Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sudan, Timor-
Leste and Ivory Coast.   
 
Bangladeshi Case Study Conclusion 
   While the status of Bangladesh in civilian control of the military and its military‟s respect for 
human rights is not as grossly deficient as Nigeria, there has been has been conflicting evidence of 
progress in these areas.  Speculation as to the origin of the mixed picture of democratic values in 
Bangladesh would have to recognize that there is substantial training from different sources.   Bangladesh 
receives substantial amounts of military training from China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey.112  For example, 
every year, several Bangladeshi military officers attend the Chinese Senior Service College program for 
international students.  Training in India and Pakistan focuses on officer skills, both technical and 
professional.  The additional sources of military training do not attempt to inculcate democratic values.  
Continuing the IMET program is more likely to have an effect in this area.  Furthermore, the U.S-
Bangladesh partnership, broader regional security and international security continues to be strengthened 
by having IMET graduates as evidenced by Bangladesh‟s involvement in peacekeeping operations, and 
regional counterterrorism, and disaster relief operations.   
 
Conclusion 
      This chapter explored the question of whether the IMET program has had any measurable 
impact on the democratic values of the militaries of participating countries.  The impact of the training has 
been haphazardly assessed in the past.  An attempt was made using the limited data available to link the 
IMET program with progress in democratic values hypothesizing that no link could be found.  In general, 
the case studies reveal no predictable positive effects from the IMET program on the progress of democratic 
values in a country‟s military.  However, some small links between the program and improvement in these 
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values were revealed in all three case studies.  There was evidence in the exploration of the Ukrainian civil-
military relations and its military‟s respect for human rights that the IMET program likely played a part in 
helping it to progress. The Nigerian case study showed that although almost no progress could be seen in 
human rights, there was some progress in civilian control of the military that could be linked to IMET.  
Finally, the study revealed the inconsistency of the human rights behavior and civilian control of the 
military in Bangladesh.  Through these case study results, it is clear that distinct consistent progress cannot 
be seen with regards to the democratic values, but even slight progress is worth the effort given IMET‟s 
role in developing security relationships and creating enduring partnerships for a relatively low fiscal 
investment.  Even the small signs of progress that are linked to the IMET program are worth the pennies 


















SECURITY & THE POWER OF GOODWILL: 
PROACTIVE U.S. NAVY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS  
 
Introduction 
Natural disasters are occurring more frequently. Between 1975 and 2009, the number of reported 
disasters has increased.113  According to the U.S. State Department, the effects of climate change, 
environmental degradation and natural disasters require varied responses from the United States.114  As a 
result of this changing environment, the U.S. military‟s security efforts have been impacted on a global 
scale.  The effects of environmental change and the overall negative effects of disasters have led not only 
to an increase in the number of humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) operations, but 
they have additionally led to strategic changes within the U.S. military.  These changes have elevated the 
importance of soft power, particularly in U.S. Navy‟s overseas missions.  
      This chapter examines the security implications of the increasing number of softer U.S. Navy‟s 
humanitarian assistance and proactive medical missions since 2004, using three case studies.  The chapter 
asks the question whether the U.S. Navy‟s humanitarian and proactive medical deployments help 
accomplish any of the Navy‟s stated strategic policy outcomes, of increasing U.S. access, influence, and 
visibility; thereby, ultimately increasing American soft power regionally.  This examination tests the 
common-held belief that humanitarian health operations cannot be linked to any significant soft power 
increases globally or in the regions in which they occur; and that these operations cannot justify their cost 
in a time of budget constraint.   
It concludes that there is a connection between these deployments and increases in American 
soft power regionally and, to a lesser extent, globally.  This connection is more strongly demonstrated in 
countries in which the United States had strained diplomatic and defense relations prior to the 
humanitarian engagements.   Given the potential benefit for outreach to countries located in strategically 
important regions where relations with the United States have historically been strained, coupled with the 
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modest monetary cost of such operations, this chapter concludes that these missions do have a significant 
soft power impact.  Halting the use of hospital ships and warships for these softer operations under the 
rubric of fiscal austerity would be a costly mistake. 
 
U.S. Navy’s Humanitarian Assistance Operations in the Past Decade 
In late 2004, an earthquake in the Indian Ocean was estimated to have released the energy 
equivalent to 23,000 Hiroshima-type atomic bombs.  It generated what National Geographic Magazine 
labeled the “deadliest tsunami in history,” causing over 225,000 deaths and displacing 1.7 million people.115  
According to Robert Kaplan, this Indian Ocean tsunami was a “curtain raiser” to disasters ahead, where in 
the coming decades more than any other time in history, people “are likely to be killed or made homeless 
by Mother Nature.”116   
The number of humanitarian assistance and civic action projects undertaken by the Department 
of Defense (DOD) rose sharply in the years following the tsunami.117  Since 2004, the U.S. Navy 
reinvigorated its small fleet of hospital ships that had “seemed headed for the scrap yard,”118 incorporated 
HA/DR operations into its core missions, and expanded the use of hospital ships to accomplish proactive 
medical deployments.   
 
Brief History of U.S. Hospital Ships 
America‟s two hospital ships, the USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort were not designed as hospital 
ships.  These two converted oil tankers – owned by the Military Sealift Command (organized under the 
DOD) – are manned with medical crews, most commonly from the U.S. Navy.  As long as twenty years 
ago, views were expressed within the Navy medical community that hospital ships should be used as a 
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national asset by the U.S. government to expand its disaster relief operations worldwide.119  Despite this 
rhetoric, however, there continues to be debate over the designation of the primary purpose of these ships.  
Some claim the ships are “obsolete” or “relics” in the mission of evacuating the sick and wounded from 
the battlefield.120  As had been expressed by the naval medical community, the service‟s hospital ships had 
not been utilized in their primary purpose of caring for wounded U.S. military personnel during wartime 
since the Vietnam War.   
 
Changes in Navy Strategy 
In 2007, two years after the tsunami relief effort, the three maritime Services – the U.S. Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard – released the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.  This strategic 
document elevated HA/DR to a core competency of the maritime armed services and essentially placed 
the soft power mission of “global cooperation” on par with hard power missions such as power projection 
and nuclear deterrence.  The strategy was heavily influenced by the perception that environmental factors 
will contribute to regional instability. It stated, “the effects of climate change may also amplify human 
suffering through catastrophic storms, loss of arable lands and coastal flooding could lead to loss of life, 
involuntary migration, social instability and regional crisis.”121  In a strategic shift, the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) remarked that preventing wars is as important as winning wars.122  A large part of that 
prevention was the expansion of military soft power.  Specifically, in the greater use of hospital ships, not 
for their previously stated primary purpose of caring for U.S. troops, but for their “secondary” purpose of 
HA/DR operations and the new soft power mission of “proactive humanitarian assistance operations.”123   
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The Beginnings of Proactive Medical Missions 
Deploying hospital ships with the sole mission of rendering goodwill and aid had rarely been 
pursued prior to 2007.  However, since the first proactive medical deployment in 2007, the U.S. Navy has 
deployed not only its white hospital ships but also its grey warships for these medical diplomacy missions 
on a routine, yearly basis.124 Overall, naval leadership has said these missions engender “trust and invite 
further cooperation in addressing our collective security interests.”125  In 2011, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff directed military leadership to focus on developing response capabilities to handle 
problems created by increasing populations in coastal areas, and to mitigate the weak ability of third world 
countries to respond to natural disasters.126  Humanitarian assistance had become the leading other-than-
war mission executed by the U.S. Navy.127   
 
Effects of Budget Constraints on New Proactive Medical Missions 
Given the current fiscal environment, national security experts continually grapple with the 
balance between applying U.S. military power through proactive humanitarian missions, and applying it 
through traditional maintenance of combat readiness.  In 2012, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral 
Jonathan Greenart stated that the Navy‟s strategy did not reduce the importance of assisting partners and 
friends, but that “there will not be a noticeable decrease in our ability to support HA/DR operations.”128  
Admiral Greenart seemed to take a more critical view of humanitarian missions, relegating them as inferior 
when compared to the Navy‟s traditional core competencies.  He has been explicit about the Navy's 
priorities: warfighting first, operating forward, and being ready.129 None of these priorities appear to 
validate the importance of HA/DR despite it being listed as a maritime core capability in the Cooperative 
Strategy.130  Despite his assertion that there would be no noticeable decrease in the Navy‟s ability to 
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perform HA/DR missions, the 2013 “Continuing Promise” proactive medical deployment to South 
America was cancelled due to the fiscal constraints of the Budget Control Act‟s “sequestration,” while the 
“Pacific Partnership” proactive medical deployment to South Asia did take place.131  Additionally, the 
hospital ships have already undergone extensive maintenance to keep them afloat and they are rapidly 
reaching the end of their serviceable life.132  To date, no formal plans to build a next generation hospital 
ship or to convert any of the old Amphibious Assault Ships (LHAs or LHDs) as had been the resounding 
recommendation just a few years ago.133 
  
Literature Review 
Most of the literature surrounding the performance of the Navy‟s humanitarian operational 
deployments using hospital ships centers around three main themes: mission operations and logistical 
efficiencies, future purposes of hospital ships, and implications of humanitarian operations on security. 
 
Mission Operations and Logistical Efficiencies 
Significant literature is dedicated to the logistical aspects of HA/DR operations indicating that 
these missions have been increasing in intensity and will likely continue in the future.  However, successful 
missions are defined in terms of efficiency of operations.  These studies do not tackle the overall strategic 
impact of the operations.  Drs. Benita Beamon and Burcu Balcik, for example, discuss performance 
measurements for humanitarian operations, but focus on supply chains and their effectiveness.134  U.S. 
Army doctor and researcher Derek Lucina wrote about the Navy‟s contribution to global health 
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outcomes.135  However, Lucina does not directly analyze the Navy‟s humanitarian operations as a security 
issue. 
 
Future Purpose of Hospital Ships 
Recent literature indicates a speculative trend about the future of the U.S. Navy‟s hospital ships.  
Some authors recommended that the U.S. Navy adapt its current fleet of ships to account for this 
predicted increase in humanitarian operations.  David Richardson suggested adding six new hospital ships 
and Coast Guard LT Jim Dulbow suggested fifteen new hospital ships and converting older Amphibious 
Assault Ships (LHA or LHD) into hospital ships in a “Great White Fleet.”136  U.S. Navy Commander 
Wayne Gluf also argued the U.S. should reconfigure LHAs from amphibious platforms for Marine forces 
into hospital/disaster relief ships for an improved capability.137   
 
Humanitarian Operations Effects on Security 
There is a dearth of literature drawing definitive conclusions about the security impact of 
humanitarian operations, the increased role of proactive medical deployments and how to evaluate their 
strategic success.  A Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study in 2008, for example, concluded that these 
missions do have a positive influence on strengthening relationships with the nations in which they 
occur.138 Another CNA “Synthesis of Analyses” conducted on these missions concluded that even though 
the outcomes of these missions are difficult to track, determining progress could occur by focusing on 
attitudinal and behavioral trends in the areas affected by the missions.139  In contrast, although Natalie 
Webb and Anke Richter conclude that researchers “clearly believe providing public health services 
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increases power and influence in the world,” they also conclude that there is little or no proof that military 
medical missions generate desired outcomes.140 Webb and Richter argue there is no process that collects 
needed data to verify whether this soft power generation lasts beyond the mission and that there is no 
research providing “evidence that hospital ship humanitarian operations missions increase security and 
stability.”141 There seems to be little information about the long-term outcome of these missions, their 
impact on diplomatic relations with the governments of the countries visited, or the effects of the missions 
on the general population. Researchers and the U.S. Government have recently acknowledged this gap in 
understanding the security impact of these operations.  A 2012 Government Accountability Office study 
called for the need for better project evaluation of the military‟s humanitarian and development assistance 
overall.142  In January 2013, Congress acknowledged the need to understand the effectiveness of these 
missions by ordering the Secretary of Defense to “develop a process to ensure that health engagements 
conducted by the Department of Defense are effective and efficient in meeting the national security goals 
of the United States.”143  Shortly thereafter, a Center for Strategic and International Studies report written 
in part by a former Chief of Naval Operations called for a “strong measurement and evaluation program” 
to be made a priority to reach a conclusion on the effectiveness of these missions but argued that the 
missions should be sustained even in increasingly constrained budgets.144 
 
Methodology of Research 
Case Study Selection 
Since 2007, the U.S. Navy has performed proactive medical engagements in 33 different 
countries.145  To assess the U.S. Navy humanitarian missions, this chapter examines three cases: Indonesia, 
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Colombia, and Vietnam. The choice of case studies was based on geography and frequency of visits.  
Additionally, an effort was made to select at least one country from deployments to the two main 
geographic regions where Navy medical engagements occur: South Asia, and South and Central America.   
      Indonesia is used as the first case study because of the unique impact of the humanitarian disaster 
of the 2004 tsunami that led to reoccurring proactive medical visits to that country.  Unlike most other 
countries, U.S. Navy medical ships have visited both Indonesia and Colombia almost every year since the 
start of these deployments.146  If a positive soft power impact could be connected to any of these 
reoccurring deployments, it would most likely occur in a region/country in which the U.S. Navy visits the 
most often.  The U.S. Navy visited Vietnam with a frequency second only to Indonesia, in the region.147 
Vietnam (like Indonesia) is chosen because it provides a case study of a country in which U.S. relations 
have historically been strained. 
 
Assessment of Soft Power Metrics 
To assess the soft power influence of these U.S. Navy missions, the Navy‟s stated objectives are 
considered.  Do these missions meet the stated objectives and do those objectives then lead to soft power 
influence?  According to Navy policy guidance for DOD Health Engagements, the missions are a 
“valuable tool” to accomplish “theater campaign plan objectives and achieve strategic end states in support 
of U.S. interests as defined in the Guidance for the Employment of Force (GEF) and the Joint Security 
Cooperation Plan.”148  The policy goes on to state the intent of these missions is the build partner capacity 
and to improve “DOD visibility, access, influence, and interoperability” in a host nation or region.149  
Following a factual account of events for each case study, an assessment is made as to the soft power 
impact of these missions using the Navy‟s stated policy objectives.  Evidence of increased access; 
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influence; and visibility is equated with an increase in soft power.  Interoperability, while important for 
joint military operations, is assumed to have less soft power impact because it deals more with how a 
military force operates tactically. 
 
Access and Influence 
      Both access and influence can be understood in the context of intensity of military-military 
operations and contact.  If a nation is increasing its military connections via exercises, personnel 
exchanges, joint training, and foreign military sales, it is likely that U.S. leadership (diplomatic or military) 
would have more access to and potentially more influence on the leadership and defense forces of the 
foreign country.  Soft power missions could open the door for more useful diplomatic relations or 
increased military partnerships with the foreign country.  The case study assessment evaluates any 
increased access during the timeframe of these new humanitarian health engagements to determine if there 
is a connection. 
 
Visibility 
      The case study assessment also evaluates ways in which these missions increase DOD visibility.  
It is a reasonable theory that the Navy‟s policy goal of visibility implies positive visibility and that positive 
visibility leads to an increase in America‟s overall soft power.  To assess visibility, local media reports on 
the engagements are considered to determine the extent and character of media attention.  Additionally, 
public opinion polls for the country in which the missions took place are examined to determine the 
existence of a connection between increased positive feelings toward the United States and the proactive 
humanitarian operations.  Finally, an overall assessment of the global visibility of these missions (visibility 
outside the immediate region of the operation) is analyzed by showing how other countries and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) may be trying to emulate the United States or cooperate with 




Case Study 1: Indonesia  
Background of U.S.-Indonesian Defense Relations 
While Indonesia was not aligned to either the United States or the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War, the United States has granted development and military aid to Indonesia since the 1950s.150  In the 
United States, this assistance was extremely controversial because Indonesian dictators and the military, 
both notorious for human right abuses, have historically ruled Indonesia.151  In the 1990s, the United 
States imposed sanctions and severed diplomatic ties with Indonesia because of its human rights record.  
After September 11, 2001, however, America became less concerned with human rights abuses and more 
concerned with Indonesia‟s effectiveness as a “partner of the War on Terror.”152  The United States tried 
to re-establish its military ties and its non-military assistance to Indonesia.153 
 
2004 Tsunami Maritime Relief Effort 
The 2004 tsunami precipitated a change in the U.S. military doctrine. Following the tsunami, the 
military shifted to a more proactive stance in responding to environmental disasters and viewed global 
health as more of a security issue.  Nine countries were directly affected by the massive tsunami.  Over half 
of the 225,000 deaths occurred in the Banda Aceh province Indonesia.  Land transportation was almost 
totally destroyed on many Indonesian islands.  Areas had lost electrical power and all communications with 
the outside world. The tsunami destroyed ports, roads, and bridges. As a result, only military helicopters 
were able to deliver aid.  
The first U.S. military unit to arrive and assist was the USS Bonhomme Richard, an LHA with U.S. 
Marines onboard.  A few days later, the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln arrived.154 The operation, 
which came to be known as “Unified Assistance” grew to encompass 22 U.S. Navy ships and six Maritime 
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Prepositioning ships over the course of 81 days and became the largest humanitarian assistance operation 
in U.S. Navy history.155   
 
Hospital Ship and Medical Missions to Indonesia 
Following the tsunami, the hospital ship USNS Mercy arrived later than many other Navy ships 
and did not begin to treat patients until more than a month after the disaster.156  However, after it was on 
station, the USNS Mercy medical crew examined over 100,000 patients and performed nearly 500 
operations on tsunami victims.157  Additionally, the crew was a mix of U.S. government and private 
personnel from a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) called “Project Hope.”  The Navy-NGO 
partnership was able to bring naval personnel and volunteers together for an unscheduled deployment. 
The partnership further relieved pressure on U.S. Navy medical personnel, who were already stretched 
because of wartime deployments.  The overall mission of “Unified Assistance” was branded a success.   
The tsunami relief effort started a trend of proactive medical deployments to Indonesia.  In 2006, 
the first post tsunami deployment occurred when the Mercy was again off the coast of Indonesia as part of 
a five-month deployment called “Pacific Partnership.”  This mission also included medical engagements 
with Bangladesh, Timor-Leste, and the Philippines.158  In 2010 and 2012, the U.S. deployed two more 
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Case Study 2: Colombia 
Background of U.S. - Colombia Defense Relations 
Colombia, the third most populous country in South America, endured long periods of “intense 
crime and mayhem” in the 20th century, characterized by kidnapping and assassinations.160  Despite its 
continued high poverty rate and five decades worth of internal conflict, Colombia has forged a “close 
partnership” with the United States especially in the areas of counter narcotics and counterterrorism.161  
After 2001, the United States increased its aid and cooperation with the Colombian government primarily 
in the form of intelligence sharing, furnishing precision-guided munitions for counter narcotics targeting, 
and military hardware such as helicopters.162  With the assistance of the U.S. government and military, the 
security conditions in Colombia improved by the time the humanitarian mission “Continuing Promise” 
first visited in 2007.   
 
Hospital Ship and Medical Missions to Colombia 
Each year from 2007 to 2011, the United States deployed its “Continuing Promise” proactive 
medical mission to Colombia.  In each of these deployments, U.S. Navy ships stopped at a different 
Colombian port, with the type of ship rotating between the Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort and an 
amphibious assault ship.  During each of these eight- to ten-day engagements, the U.S. Navy partnered 
with volunteers from humanitarian NGOs to provide medical care to between 5,000 and 7,000 patients.  
Care included minor surgeries, prescription medications, and eye exams.  Additionally, U.S. Navy 
crewmembers provided non-medical assistance tasks such as repairing medical equipment at local clinics, 
building schools, and repairing local infrastructure. 163  An outline of Continuing Promise missions into 
Colombia is summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Continuing Promise Missions to Columbia since 2007164 
Year Ship Name Type Ship Town Visited 
2007 USNS Comfort Hospital  Buenaventura 
2008 USS Kearsarge Amphibious Assault Santa Marta 
2009 USNS Comfort Hospital Cartagena & Tumaco 
2010 USS Iwo Jima Amphibious Assault Coveñas 
2011 USNS Comfort Hospital Tumaco 
 
 
Case Study 3: Vietnam 
Background of U.S. – Vietnam Defense Relations 
The United States and Vietnam had “minimal” relations for twenty years between the fall of 
Saigon in 1975 and 1995.165  The push toward normalizing relations between the two countries‟ militaries 
first occurred in 1995 and 1996.  Relations had been strained since the end of the Vietnam War but both 
countries attempted to move beyond that war‟s legacy.  The United States became focused on repairing 
economic, trade, and diplomatic relations with Vietnam and the Vietnamese Government became 
increasingly interested in bilateral defense relations.  In the late 1990s, the United States and Vietnam 
conducted some senior military leader visits and cooperated in defense related conferences and seminars.  
In 2000, the U.S. Secretary of Defense visited to Vietnam.  Even though the primary focus of the visit was 
to discuss Vietnam War POW/MIA issues, it was still a positive sign of increasing defense relations.166  In 
2003, the U.S. Navy made its first port call to Vietnam.  For the next four years, Vietnam allowed one U.S. 
Navy ship annually to make a port call in its country until the U.S. Navy‟s Pacific Partnership mission arrived 
in 2007.167  
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Hospital Ship and Medical Missions to Vietnam 
In 2007, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Gary Roughead, visited Vietnam and 
met with Vietnam‟s Ministry of Defense.  The Ministry informally inquired about the U.S. Navy visiting 
Vietnam with one of its hospital ships and stressed the “lessons of the U.S.-led disaster relief operations” 
in Indonesia in 2004.168  The Vietnamese ministries of Health and Foreign Affairs felt that the Indonesian 
environmental experience in 2004 might have significant relevance for their country.  The USS Peleliu 
(LHA 5) visited Danang City for ten days in July 2007 in the second Pacific Partnership mission, the same 
mission that had visited Indonesia the year prior with a hospital ship.169  U.S. Navy and NGOs onboard 
the ship provided medical and dental care for over 3,500 patients.  The ship also sent a “biomedical repair 
team” to repair local medical equipment, provided subject matter experts to cooperate with local medical 
personnel on best medical practices, and deployed a U.S. Navy Seabee unit to renovate schools and several 
local medical clinics and hospitals.170  Due to the success of the initial 2007 mission to Vietnam, significant 
trust was built between the two countries, and a U.S. team returned in 2008, 2010, and 2012.   
In 2008, the USNS Mercy deployed to Nha Trang, Vietnam in the Khanh Hoa Province.171  This 
visit marked the first time since 1975 that a U.S. military humanitarian assistance mission was permitted to 
perform surgeries in Vietnam.  Additionally, the mission was the first time any foreign military vessel was 
allowed to visit Nha Trang.172  In 2010, the Mercy returned to the central coast of Vietnam visiting Quy 
Nhon in the Binh Dinh Province for 13 days.173  Again, hundreds of patients were seen onboard the 
hospital ship and the U.S. Navy sent personnel to perform community service projects in conjunction with 
several NGOs and Vietnamese military personnel.174  In 2012, the Mercy again performed a similar mission 
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to Vinh, Vietnam.  This time, the U.S. Navy brought along a record 13 partner nations militaries and 23 
NGOs to provide medical care and community service projects to the region.175 
 
Analysis of the Security Effects 
The Navy and the Department of Defense assert that their humanitarian operations help a 
country in need and support the accomplishment of DOD theater objectives, specifically those related to 
improving DOD visibility, access, and influence.176  They also strengthen military and diplomatic 
relationships with the affected nations.177  If these operational goals are achieved, they are likely to create 
the conditions for an increase in U.S. soft power regionally and globally. 
 
Access and Influence Resulting From Humanitarian Operations 
Indonesia:  Initially, in 2005, there were reports that some in the Bush Administration saw the 
tsunami disaster in South Asia as a “terrific opportunity to rebuild relationships with Europe, the United 
Nations and Asia that have been badly damaged by the Iraq war.”178  Lawmakers and diplomats alike cited 
the relief efforts frequently as an illustration of way to maintain security ties in the region.  Admiral 
Thomas Fargo, former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, saw the deployment of the hospital ship as 
a way to engage with Indonesia politically.179  Increased military-to-military relations directly resulted from 
the tsunami relief effort.  The New York Times reported that the tsunami crisis cooperation between the 
U.S. and Indonesia had been a “springboard to restore closer military ties after a decade of limited 
contact.”180  U.S. Government restrictions on military aid were relaxed to allow the sale of spare parts for 
Indonesia‟s C-130 military cargo planes so they could deliver disaster relief supplies.  The Indonesian 
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defense minister appealed to Washington to provide more training for his officers.  There were hopes that 
the tsunami relief effort would “open the door” to better U.S. relations with Indonesia which had 
struggled due to the historical human rights abuses of the Indonesian military.181   
Two months after the tsunami, the U.S. resumed the International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) program for Indonesian military personnel as well as the sale of nonlethal military 
equipment.  President Bush lifted the embargo on military exports and foreign military financing to 
Indonesia and allocated a million dollars in aid to the Indonesian Navy for the following year.182  To this 
end, the tsunami relief effort was a strategic success.  The U.S. significantly reestablished diplomatic and 
military relations and trade with Indonesia following the event, and therein, fulfilled National-level goals of 
increasing the U.S. military presence in the Pacific. 
Colombia:  There is some evidence that the deployments to Colombia have helped increase 
regional security.  The Center for Naval Analyses credits the 2007 engagement in Buenaventura with 
helping to drive out drug traffickers and helping to reduce the Continuing Promise visits were associated 
with behavioral changes in the local population in an area considered by “senior Colombian officials” as a 
main export route for drug trafficking.  The U.S. Navy‟s presence slowed down drug trafficking known to 
cause regional instability by reducing the influence of drug traffickers in the area, at least temporarily. 183  
However, there is little evidence that the medical deployments in Colombia expanded access and influence 
in a way which could not have been done by already established U.S.-Colombian security cooperation ties 
such as the joint U.S.-Colombian military cooperation to detect and interdict organized crime elements and 
the U.S.-led police training of Colombian security forces.  When Continuing Promise was cancelled in 2013, 
there seemed to be no large outcry from the Colombian government or people as a result. 
Vietnam:  The Pacific Partnership missions did have a direct impact on U.S. access and an indirect 
impact on U.S. influence in Vietnam.  Since 2007, U.S.-Vietnamese bilateral relations have grown.  
Military-to-military connections improved.  The 2007 Pacific Partnership mission was the first time Vietnam 
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allowed any foreign navy to use landing craft in its territorial waters in 40 years.184 After the USS Peleliu left 
Vietnam in 2007, three Vietnamese physicians were allowed by the Vietnamese government to stay 
onboard to participate in future stops during the mission.185  In 2008, the Vietnamese Prime Minister 
Nguyen Tan Dung visited President Bush, and meet with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.186  During the 
2010 Pacific Partnership visit to Vietnam, Vietnam‟s Minister of Health along with U.S. Ambassador to 
Vietnam spent a day onboard the U.S. ship.  U.S. Ambassador Michael W. Michalak praised the mission as 
increasing the “trust and confidence between the two nations” and enhancing the “military-to-military 
relationship to a new higher level.”187  That same year, Vietnam allowed the USS John S. McCain, a guided 
missile destroyer to make a port call in Danang.188  In a symbolic step toward bettering relations, this 
particular ship was named for the admiral who commanded U.S. forces in the Pacific during the Vietnam 
War, while his son – sharing the same name – was a prisoner of war in Hanoi.   
In 2011, a year after the Mercy‟s visit to the Binh Danh Province, the U.S. DOD and Vietnam 
signed a memorandum of understanding for “advancing bilateral defense cooperation.”  This document 
aimed to enhance cooperation in five areas, one of which was humanitarian and disaster relief 
collaboration.189  The President of the U.S. National Defense University visited Vietnam while the first 
Vietnamese People‟s Army officer enrolled in National Defense University as a student.190   
Also in 2011, the U.S. Navy Surgeon General signed a statement of intent (SOI) with Vietnam‟s 
military medical director on military medical cooperation in Hanoi.  This committed both sides to continue 
exchanges and joint research.  The SOI was the first official military to military relationship between the 
United States and Vietnam since the fall of Saigon in 1975.191 The rule of allowing only one U.S. Navy ship 
per year had been changed since Pacific Partnership first came into port in Vietnam as U.S. ships now 
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“regularly call on Vietnamese ports.”192  In 2011, for example, three U.S. Navy ships were allowed to make 
port calls in Vietnam.193  U.S. State Department officials indicate that due to these reoccurring missions, 
they have “clearly developed a constructive and productive working relationship now and in the future.194 
It is important to note that regional security changes in the past decade could be another strong, 
potential contributor to the increased U.S.-Vietnamese bilateral military relations. Vietnam has tried to 
strengthen its defense relations with such countries as Russia, India, France and Australia.195  Vietnam 
could also be reaching out to the United States in response to Chinese military assertiveness.  The 
Vietnamese are fearful of Chinese influence especially in their disagreements over the South China Sea and 
see an American presence as a buffer against Chinese power in the region.196  Although, the timing of the 
first U.S. Navy medical engagements there demonstrates the mission‟s ability to increasingly open U.S. 
access in the region. 
 
Regional Visibility Resulting From Medical Missions 
When the U.S. Navy engages in an overseas humanitarian or proactive medical operation, there is 
the potential for its efforts to increase the Navy‟s and subsequently the U.S.‟s visibility in the region.  
Increased visibility could lead to a positive change in local attitudes or opinions about the U.S., thereby 
increasing its soft power capability in the region.   
Indonesia:  In the Indonesian case, the Indonesian media gave a large amount of coverage to U.S. 
relief efforts.  Eleven days after the tsunami hit, the Jakarta Post featured a “long and reverent profile of 
American pilots” with the headline, “USS Abraham Lincoln Enjoys Aceh Humanitarian Mission.”197  The 
Deputy Director of the Indonesian Survey Center wrote that one of the most memorable images in the 
Indonesian press also featured on the cover of Jawa Post was a picture of a U.S. Marine carrying an elderly 
                                                          
               192Manyin. “U.S. Vietnam Relations.”  
               193 Reuters. “U.S. Navy Ships arrive in Vietnam on scheduled visits,” 15 Jul 2011, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/15/us-vietnam-usa-ships-idUSTRE76E15220110715 >. 
               194 Thomas E. Wienz. “Pacific Partnership 2012 in Vietnam,” DipNote – U.S. Department of State Official Blog, 18 Jul 
2012, <http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2012/07/18/pacific-partnership-2012-vietnam >. 
               195 Carlyle A. Thayer. “Vietnam‟s Defensive Diplomacy,” Wall Street Journal, 19 Aug 2010, 
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703649004575438474083884494 >. 
               196 Ibid. 




tsunami victim in his arms.  The Indonesian press also covered the details of the Mercy‟s arrival, crew, and 
the numbers of tsunami victims cared for onboard.198   
According to members of the U.S. Navy‟s Medical Corps, the public-private partnership with 
Project Hope represented the “U.S. people and not just the U.S. Government.”  Their conclusion was that 
this helped make the overall tsunami relief effort well received by the local and national Indonesian 
leadership, including the military.199  The polling data from an American non-profit organization called 
Terror Free Tomorrow is most prominently cited in literature.  The organization published a report in 
2006 regarding Indonesian public opinion showing that Indonesians who opposed the U.S. efforts in 
combatting terrorism decreased by 50% in the year after the tsunami (from 72% in 2003 to 36% in 
2005).200  Others have also cited ambiguously that polls show that the U.S. is looked upon more favorably 
in affected areas.  “Poll data confirms that approval ratings of the United States tend to increase after these 
events.”201  Dr. Bruce Elleman wrote that the U.S. Navy‟s response helped to transform Indonesia‟s 
attitude toward America.202  Joseph Nye cited the positive effect of U.S. efforts in Indonesia as an example 
of soft power.203   
Other than the Terror Free Tomorrow poll, there has been no other international poll data citing 
any significant change in public opinion in Indonesia that can be directly linked to the tsunami relief 
efforts.  The U.S. Global Leadership project poll is inconclusive in its results regarding Indonesians view 
of U.S. approval.204  However, a recently released poll from the Lowy Institute in Australia showed a rather 
large increase in favorable “feelings” toward the United States over the past six years.  In 2006, 54% of 
Indonesians had a favorable view of the United States while in 2012, that percentage increased to 64%.  Of 
nine foreign countries, the United States climbed to have the highest proportion of Indonesians “trusting 
it a great deal to act responsibly in the world” (28%).  More than half (58%) of Indonesians also backed 
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the United States to be the “leading military power in Asia in 20 years” compared with only a quarter 
(25%) who chose China.205  This cannot directly be attributed to the tsunami relief efforts or to the 
proactive medical deployments that followed in Indonesia but the timeframe of mid to late-2000s 
corresponds to the beginning of opinion shift in that country.  This is the same timeframe of the medical 
deployments to the region.  Other factors such as the U.S. military withdrawal from the Muslim country of 
Iraq and the election of President Barack Obama, who lived in Indonesia during part of his childhood, are 
also viable reasons for a shift in public opinion. 
Colombia:  There is no clear evidence that public opinion in Colombia has changed significantly 
as a result of these deployments.  CNA noted that in 2008, the local Colombian population finished some 
construction projects started by the U.S. Navy and were “inspired” by the U.S. sailors “to work together to 
solve collective problems in their own community.”  The report claims that the deployment had even 
“changed the political discourse in the community.”206  The commander of the Joint Medical Group of 
Continuing Promise 2010 stated during the visit that, "after these first few days in Colombia, surveys tell 
us that 98 percent of respondents have a favorable view of the United States, so I think our efforts are 
paying off.”207  However, there appears to be no written documentation of the surveys he cited.  CNA 
reports of positive media coverage in every country Continuing Promise visited and cited that in national polls 
the center conducted in the countries in which the missions were carried out, that the mission helped 
create more favorable views toward the United States in 70% of the respondents.208  However, the data on 
the polls cited was not published. The Global Leadership project poll is inconclusive in its results 
regarding Colombians‟ view of U.S. approval.209  The best that can be hoped for is the fact that there are 
numerous online accounts and blog posts of the annual humanitarian operation there and internet usage in 
Colombia is on the rise. 210  With the advent of the internet, millions of people can read the blogs 
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associated with the deployment, see official pictures on social media sites, and read the personal stories of 
patient care in the region.211 
      Vietnam:  The Pacific Partnership missions in Vietnam show good evidence of increased U.S. 
visibility.  Local media coverage of the 2007 Vietnam mission was “remarkably extensive and positive.”212  
The state run media allowed the release of positive online and print articles about the mission.  
Additionally, the state run Vietnam television and Voice of Vietnam positively reported on the mission 
during prime time.213  There is also a correlation between U.S. approval ratings in Vietnam and visits by 
the U.S. medical ships.  A Gallup poll asking Vietnamese whether or not they approve or disapprove of 
the job performance of the leadership of the U.S. showed a 30% approval rating in 2007 when Pacific 
Partnership first visited that country.  Approval ratings grew every year the Pacific Partnership mission visited 
Vietnam, and dropped each year the medical mission did not visit the country.214  While it cannot be 
proven that the approval rating is directly linked to the deployment visits, it is an interesting trend to note 
and follow. 
 
Global Visibility Resulting From Medical Missions 
A natural tendency could be to think that these humanitarian efforts by the U.S. military 
improves overall perception of the United States not only in the affected areas but worldwide.  In 2005, as 
an example, historian and author Paul Kennedy expected “quite a modification” of positive opinion about 
the United States in Canada, Japan, and Australia as a result of the relief efforts in Indonesia.215  However, 
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there does not seem to be any evidence of long-term opinion change worldwide that can be connected in 
any way to these humanitarian efforts.  However, the missions have made two important global soft power 
impacts:  They have exposed a growing number of Non-Governmental Organizations to the U.S. military 
with positive effects; and other countries, such as China, are emulating these missions.  
      NGO Exposure to U.S. Military:  Many NGOs, especially those of a humanitarian nature, have 
historically acquired and retained a distrust of the U.S. Department of Defense.  NGOs and U.S. military 
often do not see eye-to-eye in conflict zones overseas.  However, the U.S. Navy medical missions have 
involved an unprecedented number of NGOs.  Not only are the NGO healthcare personnel volunteers 
but NGOs also come with their own donated supplies.  This cuts the cost of the missions.  Additionally, 
NGOs are able to interact with members of the U.S. military in a way that can help counter mutual 
stereotypes.  This may lead to better cooperation in the future.  Many of these civilian volunteers have 
become staunch supporters of the U.S. military.216 
      Echoing of Missions by Other Countries:  One diagnostic for perceived global mission 
effectiveness is to observe and determine if other countries employ their navies for humanitarian medical 
missions.  China‟s humanitarian efforts following the Indonesian tsunami were considered “modest” in 
comparison with the U.S. efforts.  China did not order their navy to sea.  This signaled that the U.S. 
military was still the region‟s primary security provider.217  China appears to be trying to change this 
dynamic.  David Axe noted in World Politics Review that China is expanding its country‟s soft power 
influence around the world by emulating the U.S. Navy‟s humanitarian medical deployment mission.218  
The Chinese Navy commissioned its own first hospital ship called the “Peace Ark” or “Daishandao” class 
designed specifically for hospital and humanitarian missions.219  Its first overseas deployment, called 
“Mission Harmony” occurred in 2010.  The following year, it sailed to provide humanitarian assistance to 
the Caribbean nations of Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica.220  Additionally, since the 
Indonesian tsunami, other nations have also expanded their humanitarian maritime capabilities.  New 
Zealand commissioned a “multirole” vessel HMNZS Canterbury in 2006.  It was designed to support 
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operations such as disaster relief.  Australia acquired a ship dedicated to humanitarian assistance missions 
in 2012.  The U.K.‟s acquisition of a new carrier was justified to the British public by its enabling of these 
missions.221  Clearly, these missions do have a soft power impact globally as many powers are positioning 
themselves to emulate them in the future. 
 
Cost of Proactive Humanitarian Missions in Context 
      According to the U.S. Navy‟s budget office, Military Sealift Command spent $39.25 million in 
FY2012 to operate the USNS Mercy for the entire year.222  That same year, Pacific Partnership - the mission 
for which the Mercy deployed - cost approximately $20 million.223  Therefore, performing a 150-day 
medical deployment costs an additional $20 million on top of the approximately $40 million in the 
maintenance cost of the ships annually.  Considering the U.S. maintains two hospital ships, one on each 
coast, and typically performs two proactive humanitarian operations per year, the total cost of the 
maintenance of the ships and the deployments would be no more than $120 million annually.  
Additionally, the U.S. Navy maintains the hospital ships in a ready-to-deploy status (for their primary 
purpose of caring for U.S. troops) even if the humanitarian missions are not being performed.  Moreover, 
the U.S. Navy must already spend the $40 million annually to maintain the hospital ships: the additional 
$20 million per year to perform the humanitarian missions is a modest additional in cost.  In FY2012, the 
U.S. spent $646 billion on defense.  The cost of just one day‟s operations in Afghanistan that year was 
$300 million, twice the amount spent annually in maintaining and deploying these medical ships.224  
Theoretically, the Pacific Partnership mission could be performed every year for eight years straight for the 
cost of a single F-35 joint strike fighter now being developed by the DOD.225 
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      As world population expands and migration toward the coastal regions continues, the risk of 
natural disasters affecting the large populations in these areas becomes ever greater.  The U.S. military has 
perceived this as a security threat and adapted its forces accordingly by increasing roles in humanitarian 
assistance. Additionally, the U.S. Navy has started a trend of proactive humanitarian deployments that has 
been copied by many other maritime powers.  However, since there is not a strong understanding of the 
strategic impact of these medical missions, they could easily be downsized in the current fiscal climate.  As 
Robert Kaplan stated in his book Monsoon: the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, “the future of 
American power is related directly to how it communicates its concern about issues like climate 
change…This matters just as much as the numbers of warships it has; maybe more so.”226  The U.S. 
military‟s 2005 tsunami relief mission has raised strong possibilities that efforts directed at relief of stricken 
nations have positive soft power impacts.  The continuing ability to engage in this type of soft power 
operation in the event of an environmental disaster has the potential to turn what would be a security 
threat into a positive security activity. The expansion America‟s soft power image regionally and globally 
remains vitally important for America‟s future security. 
The proactive medical engagements do show evidence of soft power impact, especially in 
countries that have not previously had robust defense relations with the United States  The missions show 
some connection to building trust with other nations and can open doors that might otherwise remain 
closed.  Given the relatively low cost and the significant soft power benefits regionally and globally, the 
United States should invest in this capability and continue the proactive missions even in a time of 
budgetary constraint.  
 
Postscript 
      The global response to the Typhoon “Haiyan” that hit the Philippines on November 8, 2013 is a 
great example of the soft power influence of humanitarian operations.  The already established proactive 
maritime medical missions the U.S. Navy had performed in the Philippines in 2007, 2008, and 2012, have 
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likely aided the ongoing U.S. maritime response to disaster areas in the Philippines both diplomatically and 
operationally.227  China‟s relatively weak response to the typhoon has been internationally criticized and the 
country has experienced a loss of regional soft power.228  In contrast, the U.S. response has received much 
international attention.  Reports indicate an improvement of defense relations between the United States 
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Introduction & Security Context 
         The proliferation of deadly biological agents is a global issue endangering “hundreds of 
thousands of lives,” and countering biological threats remains a high priority in the national security 
strategy of the United States.230  A biological attack with roots in almost any country could easily claim 
victims elsewhere and the “worldwide psychological impact of a major bioterrorism incident would be 
traumatic.”231   
      This threat is not new.  Anthrax letters were disseminated in the United States in 2001.  Plans for 
bioterrorism were set forth in documents recovered from al Qaeda training camps in 2001.  In 2007, 
security systems installed by the U.S. government thwarted an attempted theft targeted at the pathogen 
collection at the central reference laboratory for animal health in Indonesia.232  While the danger is not 
new, nonproliferation of biological pathogens is becoming more difficult.  Three major factors contribute 
to this difficulty.  First, pathogens are increasingly available because of the rapid advances in 
biotechnology.  Second, there are greatly decreased costs associated with new bio-technology, and third, 
rapid advances in information dissemination have allowed many around the world to gain access to 
complex technical biological knowledge.233  The pace of biotechnology growth is startling.234  According to 
biologist Malcolm Dando, “what would require the skills of a Nobel prize winner in one decade will 
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become commonplace laboratory practice in the next.”235  The number of facilities and individuals 
working with high-risk pathogens is rising exponentially.236  In an age of expanding international travel and 
trade, pathogens have become more mobile than ever before.  To combat these challenges, the U.S. 
Department of Defense initiated the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) as a part of the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.  Its utility and softer approach to combating these new challenges 
is the question of this chapter.   
 
Argument 
        This chapter asks the question: does the Department of Defense Cooperative Biological 
Engagement Program‟s soft power approach decrease the likelihood that dual-use biotechnology will be 
used to wage biological warfare or launch bioterror attacks?  The impacts of CBEP have not been 
thoroughly studied and the measurements of success for this program have continually changed.  The 
means to counter biological threats must likely go beyond the hard power tools of more armed guards, 
weapons or economic sanctions.  In many countries, countering these threats are not a high priority while 
international intelligence agencies “have repeatedly found it difficult to pinpoint” even developed 
biological weapon programs, much less smaller bioterrorist networks.237   
      This chapter argues that the most effective way to counter the rapidly growing proliferation of 
deadly biological pathogens being used as a weapon is the soft power approach of engagement with the 
international scientific community, especially in targeted areas of concern.  With the acknowledgement that 
there are few, if any, technical solutions to the dual-use proliferation of biotechnology around the world, 
this chapter concludes that although the effectiveness of the Department of Defense‟s (DOD) soft power 
program to counter biological threats is difficult to measure in all regions, it has had a measurable impact 
over time in selected countries.   
 
Chapter Overview 
           First, a literature review outlines the broader understanding of the extent to which soft power 
could be effective in countering weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).  In literature, certain soft power 
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impacts have been predicted to decrease the likelihood that dual-use biotechnology will be used to wage 
biological warfare or launch bioterror attacks.  Second, while acknowledging this determination, 
measurements of effectiveness of the program are reviewed in order to determine a proper methodology 
for assessing the program‟s value.  Three metrics are determined for research, a host region‟s increase in 
biosecurity, biosurveillence capability, and an increase in biological-related partnerships with the United 
States.  Finally, the methodology is tested on two case studies in which the United Stated has engaged 
through the Department of Defense‟s CBEP, one country (Republic of Georgia) and one region 
(Southeast Asia).  The two case studies lead to the conclusion that despite its limitations, the program does 
have an impact in the targeted countries it has been applied and its results suggest that the use of soft 
power to counter biological threats may be the critical means of biological nonproliferation in the future. 
 
Cooperative Biological Engagement Program Background 
              The Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, originally called the Biological Threat 
Reduction Program, is a part of the U.S. government‟s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.  
CTR was established at the end of the cold war to secure and dismantle former Soviet weapons of mass 
destruction.  It is commonly known as Nunn-Lugar, named for the two senators responsible for 
introducing legislation to fund the program.  In its beginning, the program‟s focus was on nuclear arms 
dismantlement.  However, over time, its focus changed to countering biological threats not only in the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) but worldwide.  Today, CBEP comprises nearly 60% of the CTR program,238 
is the single largest component of DOD‟s estimated $580 million in annual global health-related 
activities,239 and is considered the largest biological nonproliferation program in the world today.240 
 
Literature Review 
Extent to Which Soft Power Approaches are Effective in Countering the Use of Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction     
   
      One could easily question the applicability of soft power in countering WMDs especially when 
applied to powerful rogue states wishing to defy international agreements and norms.  The use of soft 
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power against these states is difficult to defend even as harder power approaches to WMD proliferation in 
North Korea and Iran have arguably had little success.  Soft power approaches would seem even less 
effective.  It probably was not Muammar Gaddafi‟s admiration for the United States or his desire to 
emulate American values that made him give up his nuclear weapon ambitions.  More likely, he was 
reacting to America‟s dominant use of hard power conventional force in ousting the Taliban from 
Afghanistan in 2001-02 and in quickly overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003.  In Syria, it was the 
threat of American hard power force that caused the Assad regime to agree to give up its chemical weapon 
arsenal, not Assad‟s aspiration to abide by international norms made attractive by the United States.  
Despite soft power‟s significant limitations especially in dealing with rogue states, there remains ample 
literature espousing the need for soft power approaches to countering the broader threat of biological 
WMD.  Siegfried S. Hecker argued that relationships that built trust had concrete effects to reducing global 
nuclear dangers by showing that bonds between FSU scientists and those from the west led to increases in 
safety and security of nuclear materials in the FSU, China, and South Asia.241   Soft power approaches to 
countering biological weapons use was considered particularly important because of the risks of “dual-use” 
biotechnology, a phenomenon that is global in nature and not just contained within rogue states.   
      Dual-use means that the materials, equipment, hardware, and knowledge that have peaceful 
applications can also be exploited to produce biological weapons.242  Dr. David Franz, former commander 
of the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, argued that trust and relationships are 
more important than technical solutions when it comes to countering biological threats.243  The director of 
the Centers for Disease Control concluded after the anthrax attack in 2001 and the Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003 that the “solution was to find partners around the world and 
to connect them in ways that would allow for the creation and sharing of knowledge during a crisis.”244  
                                                          
                 241 Siegfried S. Hecker.  “Adventures in Scientific Nuclear Diplomacy,” Physics Today, July 2011. 
                 242 Jonathan Tucker.  Innovation, Dual-use, and Security: Managing the Risks of Emerging Biological and Chemical Technologies 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2012), 2. 
                 243 Dr. David Franz. “With the Changing Biological threat…smart international engagement policy would lower cost and 
increase national security,” Virtual Biosecurity Center of the Federation of American Scientists, 13 November 2012. 
<http://www.virtualbiosecuritycenter.org/blog/op-ed-with-the-changing-biological-threat-smart-international-engagement-to-lower-
cost-and-increase-national-security>. 
                 244 Anne-Marie Slaughter. “America‟s Edge: Power in the Networked Century,” Foreign Affairs, Vol 88, Issue 1, Jan/Feb 
2009, 94-113. 
                    Note: In 2001, letters laced with anthrax began appearing in the U.S. mail. Five Americans were killed and 17 were 
sickened in what became the worst biological attacks in U.S. history. Source: FBI website “Anthrax Investigation” < 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/anthrax-amerithrax> (8 Feb 2014). 
                    Note: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is an upper respiratory viral infection with no known treatment.  
While many victims survive, it is often fatal.  In 2003, according to the WHO, a total of 8,098 people worldwide became sick with 
 
 65 
Researchers Caitriona Mcleish and Daniel Feakes argued the fact that scientific and industrial communities 
have initiated self-governing activities, such as codes of conduct, demonstrates that the emergence of non-
state actors such as civil society are the “serious stakeholders in the governance of biotechnologies.”245  
They conclude that although less developed than pure governmental networks, the creation of non-state 
networks is rising because the use of biological weapons cannot be managed by states alone or “addressed 
simply through a single treaty.”246 
      Within the scientific community in the past decade, consensus was built that “new approaches to 
dual-use technology governance” and security were needed due to the fact that biological technologies are 
becoming increasingly globalized and based on “intangible information rather than specialized materials 
and equipment.”247  While there was significant political and institutional support within the security 
community for harder concrete actions of dismantling facilities designed to produce biological weapons, 
there was less support (at least initially) for the softer engagement component of the CTR program.248  
However, the biological and non-institutional security communities jointly continued to lobby for softer 
power approaches to counter the bio-threat, namely increasing the use of biosurveillance, increasing global 
public health and the building of scientific security partnerships and networks. 
      The National Research Council (NRC) and global health experts argued for the importance of 
strengthening global biosurveillance networks because pathogens and diseases are not caught at the 
borders of nation states.249  The increased rate of globalization means that diseases spread quickly around 
the world.  The longer it takes to identify the presence of an outbreak, the more the pathogen will spread 
and the more people will get sick and die as a result.  According to directors of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the 2003 SARS outbreak needlessly spread to 29 countries because the Chinese 
government stalled in communicating disease information to the global community.250  In 2009, the H1N1 
influenza pandemic spread “with unprecedented speed” migrating as far in 6 weeks as previous pandemics 
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had spread in 6 months.251 
      In addition to strengthening biosurveillance and communication networks, the soft approach of 
improving global public health gained momentum.  Numerous scientists claim that improving health 
conditions could influence the intent of terrorists and could be an effective soft power tool for policy 
makers.252  Researcher, Dr. Rebecca Katz considers strong public health infrastructure as the best defense 
against an outbreak, either naturally occurring or a biological attack, because a strong public health system 
is critical to quickly identifying an outbreak, containing “the number of patients, and help restore calm to 
society.”253  The character of a strong public health system begins with local doctors having the ability and 
connections to quickly and accurately send blood samples to local, federal, and international laboratories to 
diagnose diseases.  This is the start of an effective disease containment process that eventually includes 
getting pharmaceuticals and vaccinations back to the population and enacting quarantine procedures.254  
Gregory Koblentz, a biosecurity expert, believes that the enhancement of global health security “could 
have a deterrent effect by denying terrorists the ability to cause mass casualties,” and such an approach will 
“yield more capable and willing partners” to counter future biological threats.255   
      The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 
Terrorism stated that the “United States should be less concerned that terrorists will become biologists and 
far more concerned that biologists will become terrorists.”256  Knowledge, not hardware is really the key.  
The development of harmful pathogens is complex and disseminating biological agents involves additional 
technical hurdles.257 Growing consensus evolved among experts that the international scientific 
community was in the best position to detect suspicious misuse of biology and to identify emerging 
technologies and their risk to biosecurity.  Thus, relationship building became another key component of 
soft power approaches being discussed.  Jonathan Tucker, world renown chemical and biological weapons 
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expert, proposed that strong networks would be important to counter the bio-threat because scientists 
consider biotechnology as an activity that “demands a high level of personal and communal tacit 
knowledge” and “whose technical and social dimensions are inextricably linked.”258  A strong network 
would allow the scientific community to warn of internal security threats or biological misuse.  Experts 
continue to conclude that evidence of deliberate biological misuse cannot be collected by one group but 
requires an exchange of information and “cooperative thinking across national and professional 
boundaries.”259 
      Greater cooperation between the biological community and government, and the development 
and orchestration of public-private networks was considered essential.260  A 2009 NRC report, 
commissioned by Congress, recommended that the biological component of CTR‟s major guiding 
principle going forward should be partnerships with counterpart organizations within host countries.261  A 
2009 National Academy of Sciences report on global security engagement argued for the Executive branch 
and Congress to recognize the need for the development and sustainment of “personal relationships and 
professional networks” through the CTR program as contributing “directly to our national security.”262  
Fostering this cooperation became a main effort of the Defense Department‟s soft power strategy shortly 
thereafter.   
      In 2009, the Obama Administration released its National Strategy for Countering Biological 
Threats.  This strategy placed a primary focus on strengthening international public health, and intended to 
reduce biological threats by improving global access to “tools to combat infectious diseases”; establishing 
and reinforcing “standards to discourage the misuse of the life sciences;” and instituting a “series of 
activities to help influence, identify, inhibit and interdict those who seek to harm others through the 
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misuse of life sciences.”263  Accepting the recommendations of a growing number of scientists, the 
administration more broadly recognized that biological issues involve dual use technology, and changed its 
focus from “active prevention by identifying and capturing malfeasant actors,” to cooperation with and 
education of “life science actors”264    
      In general, the main soft power approaches to countering the proliferation of biological WMDs 
espoused by scholars include such things as increasing the education of the global scientific community on 
biosecurity and biosafety, and increasing regional and local biosurveillance capacities.  Additionally, a major 
part of any soft power approach is the relationship and trust building mechanisms among the global 
scientific and security communities.  Biosurveillance capabilities, for example, will not work without the 
knowledge to use them and the trustworthy connections that allow for effective communication with 
international partners who may have more specialized diagnostic capabilities such as the United States.  
Furthermore, the ability of foreign scientists to informally communicate any perceived threats to their 
American counterparts fostered by stronger relationships is an important aspect of the success of the 
softer approach to nonproliferation. 
 
Limitations of Soft Power Approaches in Countering the Use of Biological WMDs 
      The vast majority of scholars note that is not feasible to prevent the increase in dual-use biotech 
capabilities.  However, some argue for more regulation of work in the bio-sciences.  According to Amy 
Smithson, a biological weapons expert, harder polices that carry noncompliance penalties such as fines and 
loss of certification can govern the work of scientists in the same manner as highway safety laws such as 
speed limits and drunk driving laws and she recommends that countries consider requiring scientists to be 
screened initially and periodically for problems that could “negatively influence their reliability, 
trustworthiness and reasoning.”265  On the other hand, with rapidly changing technology and a lack of 
international enforcement, others say such hard policies will only increase costs and deter scientific 
research.266  Most proponents of the soft power approach concede that such an approach will not prevent 
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all biological attacks but will only reduce vulnerabilities and mitigate the consequences of such an attack.  
Another challenge is that improving global health security may require resources beyond the allocation 
ability of many countries.  This waning interest is evidenced in the resource constraints of the WHO, 
which is “perpetually underfunded” and has “shrunk in size and influence.”267  152 countries signed onto 
the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) agreement but by 2012, fewer than 35 countries could 
comply with the biological safety and surveillance regulations.268  Most countries are more concerned with 
channeling resources into fighting natural diseases that affect their populations immediately rather than 
global bio-safety or the global bio-threat. 
      A major limitation of the soft power network approach is the tension between the scientific and 
security communities.  For networks to be effective, scientists must be willing partners with law 
enforcement, defense officials and the intelligence community.  This relationship has been strained in the 
past damaging trust and making effective cooperation in the future challenging.  Especially after the 2001 
Anthrax attacks, many scientists felt they were treated unfairly by security community.  Scientists were 
resentful of the biosecurity regulations imposed and surveys showed they were still mistrustful of those in 
the security community such as the FBI.269  Additionally, a softer approach of peer governance through 
networks even in the United States is “not exercised comprehensively or evenly.”270  Another constraint is 
the fact that the field of bio-science is becoming increasingly attractive to amateur scientists taking 
advantage of new automated equipment that allows them to tinker into work previously done only by 
those with elite skills.  These newer “biohackers” often work with even less oversight or training making 
networking even more difficult.271 
 
Measuring the Effectiveness of Soft Power in Countering the Use of Biological Weapons 
 
         The lack of measures of effectiveness of soft power in general is widely recognized.  Defense 
programs that focus on soft power approaches suffer from the same measurement challenges and 
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literature acknowledges that soft prevention missions such as the CTR are “difficult to quantify.”272  A 
NRC report concluded that determining adequate measures of program effectiveness is difficult when 
goals and objectives are largely “unquantifiable, such as relationship building and strengthening 
partnerships.”273  There is an acknowledged understanding that the benefits of soft power approaches such 
as international scientific engagement in biosecurity may not be recognizable until many years into the 
future.274  Another challenge widely reported is the fact that it is frequently difficult to separate the impact 
of DOD‟s program from the impacts of other overlapping U.S. government and international programs.275  
The separation of the various U.S. government agencies‟ programs makes analyzing the effects of any 
specific program without analyzing the whole government approach difficult.  A 2013 Center for Strategic 
International Studies report entitled a Biological Threat Prevention Strategy calls for “high-level” analysis 
to be conducted to weigh the costs and benefits of current and alternative U.S. bio threat prevention 
policies and global initiatives due to the rapidly changing dynamics in the biosciences and the seemingly 
current “uncoordinated effort of government and civil society.”276 
      Past measurements specific to the DOD‟s CBEP included numeric metrics such as the numbers 
of facility upgrades, consolidated pathogen collections, number of weapon scientists involved in projects, 
number of scientists trained, number of cooperative research projects and the level of matching 
contributions by cooperating governments.277  In 2007, the NRC recommended that as the program 
grows, more “intensive evaluations” are “highly desirable” and suggested that measurements take into 
account such things as timeliness, adequacy, and quality of responses to outbreaks should they occur.278  
Two years later, NRC recommended that the DOD continue to track the quantitative measures of 
effectiveness but also look at how to track improvements on identifying diseases and information 
sharing.279  The need for better measures of effectiveness regarding the CBEP has driven the DOD to 
continually change its evaluation metrics.  In 2010, the DOD submitted an overall CTR Metrics Report 
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showing 25 different measures of effectiveness for the CBEP program.280  Although the latest National 
Academy of Sciences report in 2012 stated that these metrics were useful and complete, it criticized the 
program for not prioritizing them and not clearly linking them to threat reduction.281  A DOD memo in 
August 2013 outlined new implementation guidance for the CBEP that calls for its activities to be 
“measured against a metrics model outlined in a separate annex.”282  However, that annex is either not 
written yet or not releasable.  To this day, steady measures of effectiveness continue to be a challenge for 
the DOD and the overseeing bodies of this program. 
 
Methodology: Proposed Measures of Effectiveness  
      A major constraint to researching the effectiveness of the Cooperative Biological Engagement 
Program is the lack of published documents about to the program.  Most of what is publicly available 
concerning the program, even from the Defense Department, are broad generalizations of the program‟s 
success without further specifying data.  The 2013 DOD memo outlines three “strategic policy objectives” 
for the program, the destruction of biological weapons and related equipment, the enhancement of 
capabilities to secure dangerous pathogens, and the enhancement of detection and diagnosing biological 
incidents “of security concern.”283  The first of the three policy objectives I chose to omit from studying 
because it only applies to FSU partner countries and is largely complete.  I sought out assessments that 
look forward to what will be needed in other regions in the future and most countries do not have large 
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1 - Facilities Biosafety and Biosecurity Upgrades 
      Facilities biosafety and biosecurity upgrades are the most tangible measurement of the soft 
power approach.  Upgrading facilities does not just mean making sure a laboratory has a fence surrounding 
it and locks to important facility locations, but also training local scientists to use safety measures in order 
to help prevent the unintended release of dangerous pathogens.  One concrete way to measure facilities 
upgrades is through the Biosecurity Level (BSL) rating system.284 Another example of progress would be 
the physical consolidation of pathogens into fewer central repositories with better security.   
 
2 - Increases in Biosurveillance Capability and Willingness to Report 
     Effective communicable disease control relies on high-quality disease surveillance.285  Largely, 
this is a product of how quickly local officials can identify a biological incident, and how interconnected a 
country is at the local level with national and international laboratories.  Evidence of this connection can 
be seen in the technical form of presence of internationally recognized biosurveillance systems, and also 
the means and knowledge to use them, tested either in simulations of or real life outbreak responses.286 
 
3 - Increases in Joint Biological Projects, Conferences and Workshops that Bring Scientists Together 
      The softest measurement of effectiveness, and also the most difficult to quantify, is the 
relationship building piece of this program.  One can assume that the more joint projects undertaken 
successfully, and the more conferences/workshops held and widely attended, the more informal 
relationships will take hold.  Joint projects often lead to the publication of scientific work in international 
journals.  This greatly increases transparency, and discussion of possible security implications.  
Conferences and workshops are assumed to expose scientists to the international community (both 
scientific community and security community) and create informal networks that could be used as an 
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informal but critical reporting means in the event of a crisis.  As in the case of SARS in China in 2003, if 
the government of the country in which the outbreak occurs is able to diagnose the outbreak but fails to 
report what is going on to the global community, whether due to a lack of trust or due to a lack of 
scientific and security connections, the result can be catastrophic.  This is why softer mechanisms such as 
conferences, projects, and seminars that build relationships and networks become so important to the 
overall goal of preventing a biological weapon use.  
 
Case Study Selection 
            CBEP has almost a twenty-year history in seven different FSU countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan).287  Any case study must include at least one of 
these countries that have had such a history with the program.  The Republic of Georgia was selected 
because more data was available about the Georgia-U.S. links through the CBEP than many of the other 
countries.  A regional perspective was chosen for the second case study.  Over time, the focus of CBEP 
changed from bilateral engagement to regional engagement.  While CBEP has expanded into two other 
major regions beyond the FSU in in the past few years, the relatively short duration of engagement so far 
makes it very difficult to obtain sufficient evidence on the three measures of effectiveness for any single 
country in those areas.  Southeast Asia was selected over Africa because the CBEP has had slightly more 
time to develop in that region (approximately one extra year).  
 
Case Study #1: Republic of Georgia 
Background/History of the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program in Georgia 
      After the fall of the Soviet Union, the new Republic of Georgia struggled with a poor economy.  
The healthcare system seemed nearly “non-existent.”288  Meanwhile, thousands of scientists now spread 
throughout the FSU “lost their jobs, went unpaid, or received meager salaries insufficient to support their 
families.”289 In addition, the region is naturally prone to continual outbreaks of highly infectious disease.  
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Central Asia's economic crisis after the fall of Soviet Union, its proximity to unstable states, and the Soviet 
bioweapons legacy made U.S. engagement with Georgia and other FSU countries a priority.290   
       From 1998-2007, funds allotted to Georgia amounted to $95.7 million, or 25% of the total CBEP 
funding.291  Initially, the funds were almost exclusively used for the dismantlement of suspected former 
Soviet BW facilities and securing pathogens.  The non-Russian states of the FSU, including Georgia, were 
“willing partners” to this initial goal.292  When the Soviet Union collapsed, these facilities lacked security 
and safety measures and many were in disrepair.293  CBEP funds helped to dismantle biological weapon 
(BW) facilities and destroy excessive dual-use equipment.  As the former Soviet BW capacities were 
completing destruction, CBEP transitioned to funding the softer aspects of bio-engagement.   
 
Facilities Upgraded or Constructed by CBEP 
      Over the past decade, CBEP funds have been allocated for numerous upgrades of Georgia‟s 
biological laboratories, primarily focusing on increased security and safety.  The largest area of progress in 
biological facilities upgrades in Georgia is the completed construction and operational capability of the 
Georgia Central Health Reference Laboratory, which was renamed the Richard G. Lugar Center for Public 
Health Research in 2012 by the government of Georgia.294  This is a laboratory built to BSL-3 (Biosecurity 
Level 3) standards intended to secure all dangerous pathogens in the country and provide the capability to 
characterize pathogens and validate diagnoses.295  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, 
and Biological Defense Programs, Andrew Weber, described this facility as a “new, modern disease control 
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possible vaccine need.” Biokombinat‟s lack of use after the fall of the Soviet Union and large industrial size biological equipment 
made it a “dual use hazard” and by 2007, CBEP funds helped to complete the dismantlement of the facility, destruction of its dual-
use equipment and destruction of its Foot and Mouth Disease virus stocks. 
                  Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency. “Cooperative Biological Engagement Program,” Official slides, provided by 
Mr. Lance Brooks, Director CBEP, on 7 February 2014, slide 13 and Defense Threat Reduction Agency, talking points, 5. 
                 294 Department of Defense. “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2014,” 30 September 
2013, 22. 
                     Note: Georgia named the facility after former U.S. Senator Richard “Dick” Lugar, a key legislator enabling the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program commonly known as the “Nunn-Lugar program”.  CBEP falls under the much larger 
CTR program.  
                 295 National Research Council The Biological Threat Reduction Program, 68. 
                     Note: BSL-3 means the facility has a “high” level of containment while BSL-4 has the “maximum” capacity for 
containment.  Source: Lela Bakanidzel, Paata Imnadze1 and Dana Perkins. “Biosafety and biosecurity as essential pillars of 
international health security and cross-cutting elements of biological nonproliferation,” BMC Public Health, 3 Dec 2010, 
<http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/S1/S12/ >.  
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center for the South Black Sea and Caucuses region.”  The center has modern “biosafety and good 
security, but also has important cutting edge diagnostics, and genetic sequencing capability.”296  CBEP 
funds also provided new equipment and systems to help with better pathogen security.  For example, the 
Pathogen Asset Control System is now deployed in Georgia.  It is a modern system for accounting, 
management and control of biological agent stocks.297  The Lugar Research facility is a joint Georgian-U.S. 
laboratory staffed by Georgian, U.S. and international technical experts.  This lab is already functioning 
according to its website and the Defense Department says it will be “fully operational by 2018.”298   
 
Surveillance Abilities Improved by CBEP in Georgia 
      One of the goals of CBEP was to enhance bio surveillance by establishing a threat detection and 
response network in FSU countries.  In Georgia, program funds were used to install a system called the 
Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) and to train Georgian scientists on its use.299  
This “sustainable” system is said to improve detection, diagnosis, and reporting of “especially dangerous 
pathogen outbreaks.”300 The system not only links all the Georgian ministries who need to know of an 
outbreak (Ministry of Health, Defense and Agriculture)301 , but also links with the other countries in the 
region and data can be sent off “in near-real time to U.S. counterparts.”302 The establishment of this bio 
surveillance system also brings together Georgian, American, and International scientists.  Its project team 
includes members from several U.S. Government organizations, not just American Defense Department 
officials and its training “implementers” include academic and foreign entities such as Penn State 
University and the UK Health Protection Agency.303 According to DOD, initial assessments of the 
                                                          
                 296 Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Audio Interview with Andrew Weber and Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins 
on Biosecurity,” 14 Sept 2012, < https://csis.org/multimedia/audio-interview-andrew-weber-and-ambassador-bonnie-jenkins-
biosecurity>.  
                 297 Defense Threat Reduction Agency slides, #15. 
                 298Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research official website. <http://tandh.dnsdojo.com/cphrl/> (11 
February 2014). 
                    Lance Brooks, Director of the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program. Interview with Amy McGrath. Personal 
interview. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Alexandria, Virginia, 7 February 2014. 
                 299 Defense Threat Reduction Agency slides, #17. 
                 300 Defense Threat Reduction Agency slides, #18. 
                 301 Richard Obiso. “United States Department of Defense Cooperative Biological Engagement Program: Program 
Overview and Establishing Sustainable Research Programs in Georgia,” The Microbe Company, LLC, 
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                 302 Kassenova, “Biological Threat Reduction.” 
                 303 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, talking points. 
                Note: project team includes members from Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Center for Diseases Control, Walter Reed 
Army Institute for Research, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Armed Forces Health 
Surveillance Center, and Naval Medical Research Center. 
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surveillance system in Georgia have already successfully taken place totaling 122 sites for 500 end users in 
2012.304 
 
CBEP Engagement Projects and Training in Georgia 
       CBEP has funded numerous cooperative biological research projects, training, exercises, and 
conferences intended to “understand disease baseline, increase transparency, encourage higher ethics 
standards, and strengthen the integration of scientists into the international community.”305  In 2012 alone, 
CBEP offered 317 classes with over 99,000 student contact hours.306  CBEP funded the “Southern 
Caucasus Workshop on Public Health, Security”, the “Law Enforcement Partnership in Bio-Incident Pre-
Planning and Response” exercise and the associated “Southern Caucasus BioShield 2010 Tabletop 
Exercise” that were held in Tbilisi, Georgia, in 2010.307  All activities were co-organized by the Georgians.  
In 2007, the National Academy of Sciences reported four joint Georgian-American biological research 
projects funded by CBEP.  On average, each cost around $750,000 but many have led to numerous 
publications in scientific journals.308  The Georgian project of  “Characterizing Yersinia pestis strains led to a 
publication in Clinical Mircobiology and Infection.309  Another project analyzing Vibrio cholera using new 
technology led to over 12 publications.310 
      Additionally, in all of these projects, conferences and training, scientists are drawn from a variety 
of U.S. government agencies and academic institutions.  CBEP works with eight different American 
universities to aid in these efforts.311  For example, the project “Clinical, Epidemiologic, and Laboratory-
Based Assessment of Brucellosis in Georgia” involves scientists not only from the US Army Medical 
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, and Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, but also from 
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                     Brooks, Interview. 
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Louisiana State University.  Another project called “Active Surveillance of Especially Dangerous Pathogen 
in Southern Caucuses Region” involves the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Naval Medical 
Research Center.312   
      Exact numbers of scientists trained, conferences held, and research projects undertaken could 
not be determined.  However, there is evidence that the training has been successful.  In 2009, Georgian 
scientists trained under the CBEP, and working in CBEP supported laboratories were responsible for 
diagnosing a case of avian influenza and the “clinical recognition, epidemiological investigation, laboratory 
diagnosis, and successful response to outbreaks of the Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever” in Georgia.313  
Their training enabled them to identify the source of that outbreak in their country to a tick in 
Uzbekistan.314  In addition, the lab network in the FSU that the CBEP program helped build was crucial to 
the identification of Georgia‟s case of a orthopoxvirus.  The Orthopoxvirus genus includes camelpox, 
monkey pox, and smallpox, a deadly virus that has been a threat to humans for centuries.315  In this case, 
Georgian scientists used the developed network to immediately ship the unidentified pathogens to the 
United States‟ Center for Disease Control laboratory in Atlanta, GA for verification.316   
      Due to the training, joint research and engagement venues that CBEP has helped to provide, 
Georgian scientists are very active in collaborating with the World Health Organization and other 
organizations and partners in technical consultations related to the International Health Regulations.”317  
Georgian biosafety domestic laws and biological risk management now involves a set of regulations on 
biosecurity that is based on the U.S. Select Agents Rule, and similar rules and norms the U.S. enforces 
regarding facilities, personnel registration, emergency response, record keeping, inspections, notifications 
for theft, loss or release, transfer, and import/export guidelines.318 
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Analysis of Georgian Case Study 
      In the case of Georgia, all three of the measurements for successful engagement demonstrate 
that over a 20-year period, and for a relatively modest monetary investment, great strides can be made not 
only in biosecurity but also in the development of closer defense and leadership ties to a foreign country.  
The Georgian Lugar Research Center staffed by American and Georgian citizens, for example, helps the 
United States understand the disease distribution in that part of the world to “get us to the point that we 
can track disease events, biological events like we track the weather.”319  The surveillance system 
investment is crucial to linking to global response capabilities.  If what constitutes the normal status quo 
can be understood using historical data, new scientific tools such as the bio surveillance system can be 
applied to quickly identify “abnormal events no matter what their cause, whether it is natural or a 
deliberate biological incident.”320  The engagement piece has also been successful based on the increased 
transparency of published scientific research, and the increased networking between American and 
Georgian scientists. The fact that the staff at the Lugar facility is jointly comprised of American, Georgian 
and international scientists reinforces international partnerships.321  The World Health Organization‟s 
report card on countries complying with the IHR shows that Georgia is among the very best scoring 100% 
for capacity in such areas as legislation, coordination, surveillance, response, preparedness, and 
communication (91% in laboratory).  This is very high in comparison to other countries worldwide.322 
      While the Georgian case is largely successful, a DOD policy official noted that the 20-year 
involvement with Georgia is actually a really good lesson for the overall CBEP program in that the United 
States may have “built more capacity than was needed.”323  This indicates a learning process taking place 
within the DOD on the amount of facilities and engagement DOD feels is needed to meet constantly 
changing goals.  What would aid in this assessment process would be more readily available information 
on the program‟s projects within its partner countries.  According to the DOD, this program has no 
classified elements and is completely transparent.324  There is no reason why the program should not have 
a detailed comprehensive country-by-country (or regional) outline of all its activities.  Unfortunately, that is 
                                                          
                 319 Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Audio Interview with Andrew Weber.”  
                 320 Ibid. 
                 321 Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research official website. “About CPHRL” 
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not the case currently.  The program is documented in general terms only, making assessments, even ones 
as obvious as the Georgian case, difficult to measure.   
      Georgia has been able to overcome the challenge of enacting its own national legislation that 
adapts to Western norms and regulations, one that requires a minimum internationally recognized standard 
of biosafety and security.  However, the mechanisms for implementation of these laws are still being 
developed.  Enforcement of legislative regulations, effective screening of Georgian scientists (particularly 
ones who have received research grants) and changing the country‟s criminal code to enforce sufficient 
penalties for bio-crimes remains a challenge.325  There is also concern that legislation can be easily changed 
or in Georgia based on persons in power.  Dangerous pathogens are being handled in that country not by 
professionals but by less qualified “specialists” with no practical experience.326  Though, without the 
resources provided through the CBEP in terms of exposure to security expertise and funding, Georgia 
would likely have a much harder time complying with the IHR.  As stated earlier, Georgia is currently one 
of 35 countries (out of 152) who have met the IHR standards.327  The tension between scientific and 
security communities in Georgia seems to be quelled by the fact that the staff of Georgia‟s main laboratory 
that houses dangerous pathogens has a robust and willing partnership with United States scientists funded 
by the security-minded DOD.  It is important to note that the investments of CBEP in Georgia do not 
seem to stem the potential growth of the biohacking, a limitation of the soft power approach outlined in 
the literature review.  Overall though, the investments in Georgian biosecurity and biosafety, and the 
funding of modern disease surveillance infrastructure and capabilities have led to proven detection and 
response to outbreaks in a timely manner, most likely faster than what would have occurred without 
CBEP‟s engagement in Georgia.  CBEP not only strengthened public health and biodefense capacities but 
also its engagement piece served the larger purpose of building trust between the U.S. Government and 
Georgian government.  The sustainability of the program makes it likely these positive results will continue 
with the acknowledgement of the limitations of such an approach. 
 
Case Study #2: Regional Perspective – Southeast Asia  
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Background/History of CBEP in Southeast Asia 
        Southeast Asia is home to almost “every global emerging disease threat, including potential 
pandemic influenza strains.”328  Outbreaks of diseases in the region have not only claimed lives but also 
have had a negative economic impact.  The estimated impact of SARS across Asia in 2003 was $30 
billion.329  Politically over the past decade, many of the region‟s countries are evolving from autocratic 
political systems to young democracies and have proactively sought a stronger bilateral relationship with 
the United States.330  In 2011, the DOD received authorization to expand the CBEP beyond the FSU.  In 
October 2012, Senator Richard Lugar and several Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff members 
traveled to the region to encourage relationships through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program “as 
part of the renewed strategic emphasis by the United States on relations with the countries of the 
region.”331  Today, as part of the CTR program, DOD‟s CBEP is most heavily engaged with Vietnam, has 
“more targeted projects” in Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia, and expects growth in the Philippines.332  
According to DOD officials, there is good emphasis on working with already established regional 
networks such the Asian Pacific Biosafety Association.333  Goals in this region are tailored to the specific 
needs of each country while encouraging regional cooperation. 
 
Facilities Upgraded or Constructed by CBEP 
      According to the CBEP Director, in the Southeast Asian countries, military laboratories provide 
80% of the diagnostic services to the regional population.334  This makes DOD‟s CBEP a natural way to 
help influence an increase in biosafety and biosecurity in the regional laboratories because the United 
States Defense Department is building upon already established military-military relationships.  In 
Vietnam, CBEP provided consultative support towards the construction of new BSL-2 facilities for 
Vietnam‟s National Center for Veterinary Diagnostics and the National Hospital for Tropical Diseases.  In 
both Vietnam and Cambodia, CBEP provided laboratory equipment and upgrades to multiple national 
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laboratory facilities.335  Malaysia‟s biological facilities were already advanced.336  Therefore, the program 
tailored its resources there towards partnership building with that country‟s Science and Technology 
Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), the largest proponent of biosecurity in that country. 
 
Surveillance Abilities Improved by CBEP in Southeast Asia 
       Many of the countries in this region have different types of biosurveillence and reporting systems 
of various qualities, some with proven success such as the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance Network.337  
Therefore, the Southeast Asian regional goal of CBEP is not necessarily to institute DOD‟s Electronic 
Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS), a platform provided to a host nation, which may choose 
to share data with the U.S. government.338   Rather, the goal is enhance whatever system a country has 
already in place in order to bring the country into compliance with the World Health Organization‟s 2005 
IHR.  There is interest among partner nations, especially Vietnam, for implementation of e-surveillance 
systems such as EIDSS but issues such low absorptive capacity, lack of national legislative support, and 
lack of a robust communications infrastructure have prevented implementation.339  Three of the four 
CBEP countries in Southeast Asia are involved in the DOD‟s Global Emerging Infectious Surveillance 
(GEIS) biosurveillance network that was active in 73 global outbreak responses in fiscal year 2011.340 
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However, this is an area where more can be done as three of the four CBEP partner countries are still not 
in compliance with IHR biosurveillance standards.341 
 
CBEP Engagement Projects and Training in Southeast Asia 
      According to the DTRA Director, a major difference between the engagement in the FSU and 
the newer engagement program in Africa and Southeast Asia is a focus on regional cooperation.342  When 
the program first started in the FSU, bilateral engagements were seen as more productive because building 
a regional consensus and cooperation were not as feasible at the time.  In Southeast Asia, however, there is 
a greater understanding that the threat is a regional (or global) problem as opposed to being contained 
within the border of a nation-state.  CBEP has supported multiple workshops and training across 
Southeast Asia to date. Most recently, in January 2014, CBEP (partnered with US Department of Health & 
Human Services [HHS] and US Pacific Command) hosted a workshop designed to “assist Lower Mekong 
countries developing and planning their own national preparedness plans.”  Similar workshops in the past 
have included support to the ASEAN Regional Forum bio-preparedness exercises.343  In Cambodia, CBEP 
has provided various diagnostic training and quality management systems training.  This involvement in 
the human and animal health sectors there has helped to establish the DOD “as a trusted partner, 
providing increased access” and “opportunities for further engagement.”344  In Vietnam, the government 
is identifying the gaps in biosecurity as a result of consultation with CBEP and has grown increasingly 
transparent in their efforts to fill those gaps by releasing their projects.345  In Malaysia, DOD has seen the 
most progress with “astounding results” in increased connections between the Ministry of Defense and 
DOD.  Government and scientific representatives who may have only met for the first time during a 
CBEP-STRIDE workshop are “talking openly about sector-specific practices and needs and have 
demonstrated a willingness to work together for bio- preparedness.”346  Malaysia has increased its 
participation and presentations in the BWC meetings with the help of CBEP experts and consultations.347  
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Government officials have started to revise legislation to address biosecurity and CBEP‟s involvement has 
enhanced Malaysia‟s ability to implement this pending legislation.348   
 
Southeast Asia Analysis 
      Although CBEP has only been engaged in the Southeast Asian region for a short amount of 
time, the lower-level cooperation through CBEP has led to modest improvements in capabilities for the 
partner countries, strengthening the biosafety and biosecurity in the region.  The fact that the program has 
clearly promoted a more open dialogue in Malaysia, and that Vietnam is interested in a biosurveillence 
partnership with the United States are good examples of incremental progress.  The positive relationships 
built with CBEP also have the potential to expand engagements with other DOD programs as well.  For 
example, CBEP funds the Naval Medical Research Unit-2, Armed Forces Research Institute for Medical 
Sciences‟ laboratory in Phnom Penh, Cambodia as part of its engagement with that country.  This 
laboratory supports U.S. interests in DOD‟s Pacific Command (PACOM).349  It is important to note that 
CBEP may not develop in any of the Southeast Asian countries the same way it developed in the Republic 
of Georgia.  Each country in this region has different needs. For example, Malaysia already had robust 
biosecurity and biosafety practices implemented throughout its national laboratories prior to the expansion 
of CBEP into its region and it did not need any assistance with facilities upgrades or technical assistance in 
this area.350  Most of the engagement with that country focused on the enhancement of scientific and 
security partnerships and relationships.  Additionally, each country within the region has different 
limitations for implementation of CBEP within its borders.  For example, although Vietnam has expressed 
interest in increasing its biosurveillence capacity, a lack of national legislative support has prevented its 
implementation.351  The program is limited by regional political processes in some countries in the region.  
For example, political issues in Indonesia have so far stifled any implementation of CBEP engagement in 
that country.352   Bilateral agreements with most countries also tend to take a long time to put in place but 
some progress is likely to continue if investments remain. Even though each country in the region may be 
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different as to the extent of CBEP engagement and some countries currently may not be able to be 
engaged at all, the program shows modest progress in the three areas of measurement from a regional 
perspective. Additionally, the program shows a great deal of potential for expansion in this region over 
time.   
 
Defense’s Role in Soft Power Biological Engagement Programs  
      Any assessment of CBEP alone is limited because it does not always consider accomplishments 
and/or failures of the numerous other U.S. Government programs all designed to do roughly the same 
type of global biological engagement.  There are more than 25 presidentially appointed and Senate-
confirmed positions within the various agencies of the federal government with “responsibility for 
organizing a federal response to biological threats.”353  Of the programs that focus specifically on foreign 
biological engagement, the Defense Department‟s is still the largest.  The State Department‟s Bio Security 
Engagement Program maintains the exact same three goals of engagement as CBEP but has only 1/10th 
the budget.354  USAID maintains an “Emerging Pandemic Threats” (EPT) program to build capacity to 
combat diseases in many developing regions.355  HHS (CDC and Prevention and National Institute of 
Health) and US Department of Agriculture manage six different programs of the same types of 
engagement.356   
       Because there continues to be “confusion and an overlap of responsibilities,” it is appropriate to 
ask why this program should be managed by Department of Defense and not a more traditional soft 
power agency such as the Department of State, HHS or USAID.357  Certainly, there is greater health and 
scientific expertise in many of the other agencies.  However, I contend that that it is not as politically 
feasible to fund a domestic agency such as HHS and CDC to train and build infrastructure in foreign 
countries.  Meanwhile, international development budgets at the Department of State and USAID are 
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consistently underfunded.  Soft power programs such as CBEP being funded by “defense” dollars may be 
less conspicuous in a very large DOD budget.  Additionally, Defense officials cite that the DOD brings an 
important and different approach to engagement, namely a greater expertise and emphasis on security and 
safety issues as opposed to other government agencies that may be more focused on health, diplomatic or 
development concerns.358  DOD manages a larger and globally established logistics and personnel 
network.  DOD has connections through the combatant commands‟ headquarters and experience in 
security assistance though defense attaché and security cooperation officer links worldwide.  DOD already 
has an established overseas network of laboratories and medical research facilities that provide bases for 
supporting such a program.359  Furthermore, in countries with weak civilian emergency response capacity, 
governments often turn to their militaries for emergency responses.  A focus on military-military activities, 
on building military public health capacity could fill important gaps in global disease detection and 
response.360  Practically, despite the inefficiencies, the federal bureaucracy and legislative barriers may be 
too great to combine funding for biological engagement programs into one agency and in a time of fiscal 
constraint, a program like CBEP may be better off from a funding perspective in a larger defense budget 
than a small, specialized agency more affected by sequestration.  A more important concern for this soft 
power program may be that with Senator Lugar no longer in Congress, the program has less support on 
the Hill.  Soft power programs such as CBEP have no American constituency lobbying for their need.  
Unlike other defense programs such as weapons systems, vehicles and airplanes, programs such as CBEP 
create very few jobs in states and districts to bolster Congressional backing.  This fact may prove 
worrisome in a time of budget cuts but the program is still better off nested within the Defense 
Department rather than anywhere else. 
 
Conclusion  
              Although the soft power approach of CBEP has its limitations and measurements of success are 
difficult to evaluate, the 20-year effort in Georgia was worth the investment.  This engagement has 
increased transparency and trust, considered so important to outbreak reporting and understanding the 
                                                          
                 358 Brooks, Interview. 
                        Reid, ,Interview. 
                 359 Kellie Moss and Josh Michaud.  “The U.S. Department of Defense and Global Health: Infectious Disease Efforts,” 
Kaiser Family Foundation Report, October 2013, 2.  
                 360 Center for Strategic and International Security. “From Conflict to Pandemics: Three Papers from the CSIS Global 
Health and Security Working Group,” Washington, D.C., May 2010, 4. 
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intentions of scientists who work with dangerous pathogens.  It is too early to conclude the same regarding 
the program in Southeast Asia, but initial signs are positive.  CBEP‟s success in Georgia may not be easily 
replicated in all countries in Southeast Asia, or in other areas such as Africa.  For this type of soft power 
program to succeed in all three areas of measurement, the host country must be a very open and willing 
partner, as exemplified in the Georgia case study.   However, progress in any of the metrics outlined in this 
research is worth the effort so even if a country is not fully welcoming on all engagement fronts, the 
program still has merit.  What is special about all the countries that have been engaged by the CBEP is that 
they volunteer for some level of connection.  They may not be strong allies of the United States (such as 
Vietnam), but they agree to further partnership.  Should this program in the future result in countering or 
mitigating an outbreak or a biological terror incident in one of these partner countries, it increases the 
possibility that more countries (especially non-allies) may be incentivized to partner with the United States, 
opening new doors for cooperation and diplomacy.  Additionally, a soft power program‟s success is 
broadened by the fact that other countries wish to emulate American actions.  There is evidence CBEP has 
generated this type of momentum internationally as many European countries are now very engaged in 
taking on the biosecurity problem globally.361   
      Although it may be clear that programs that help increase biosafety and biosecurity in many 
countries with weak practices are worth the investment, given that a host country is a willing participant, it 
is less clear whether that investment should be undertaken from the defense establishment or by another 
federal agency.  Practically though, funding for such soft power projects will most likely remain within the 
DOD for bureaucratic and political reasons. CBEP‟s engagement approach, still in its beginning phase, 
needs to be continued as an important part of a long-term solution to an uphill battle.  Recently, U.S. 
diplomats to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Conference reported that overall trust building 
efforts are getting worse rather than better as they cited only 63 of 166 countries had submitted “voluntary 
data about bio-related activities under confidence-building measures sought from all BWC member 
nations over the past year.”362  However, this does not mean that soft power programs are not working; in 
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fact, it may be testimony to the need for more of them.  Given the fact that the United States will not 
agree to any mandatory monitoring of the biosciences, soft power programs such as CBEP become 
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                363 Note: In 2001, the United States withdrew from the multi-year talks to negotiate a binding verification mechanism for 
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   While the hard power programs within the Department of Defense are the most prominent, its 
soft power programs should not be discounted.  Even though they may only be moderately effective in 
increasing U.S. soft power in the present day, they are extremely low cost and they add an important 
additional tool that can be leveraged given today‟s changing security environment.  Indeed, many of 
America‟s softer power approaches to security may best be accomplished by the country‟s hard power 
agency.  Highlighting this fact and the relative value of soft power approaches is more important now than 
ever before as defense budgets decrease. While it‟s challenging to define the effectiveness of softer power 
programs, this thesis contends that due to the nature of future threats, these programs may become 
increasingly important security tools for the United States.   
 
Chapter Summaries 
      This thesis examined three different soft power programs either funded and/or managed by the 
Department of Defense to address the primary question of each program‟s worth in comparison to its 
investment.  Chapter one examined the soft power effect of educating foreign military leaders.  That 
chapter specifically asked the question: does the IMET (International Military Education and Training) 
program affect a foreign military‟s “democratic” values and policies?  Through the use of three case studies 
(Bangladesh, Ukraine, and Nigeria), indirect links to American education of foreign military leaders 
through IMET were demonstrated to have a positive influence on increasing democratic values in 
recipient military forces, although this progress was inconsistent.  Even slight progress that is indirectly 
linked to IMET is worth the effort given the program‟s broader role in developing security relationships 
and creating enduring partnerships for a relatively low cost. 
      Chapter two examined a U.S. Navy soft power program by asking the specific question: does the 
U.S. Navy‟s increased use of proactive medical humanitarian assistance deployments improve U.S. 
visibility, access, and influence in the regions in which they take place?  This chapter also looked at three 
case studies of countries hosting these annual deployments (Indonesia, Colombia, and Vietnam).  Despite 
some research limitations, this chapter concluded that there is a connection between these deployments 
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and increases in U.S. soft power regionally and to a lesser extent globally.  This connection is stronger in 
regions where security relations with the United States have historically been strained and these missions 
have provided an important tool in strengthening regional security relationships.  These results and the 
modest monetary cost of such deployments make this program still worth the effort during a time of 
budget constraint. 
      Chapter three examined a soft power Defense Department program to counter the use of 
biological weapons of mass destruction.  With rapidly changing scientific and communication advances, 
the uses of traditional hard power tools to fight biological weapons are being doubted.  This chapter asked 
the question: does the Department of Defense Cooperative Biological Engagement Program‟s (CBEP) 
soft power approach decrease the likelihood that dual-use biotechnology will be used to wage biological 
warfare or launch bioterror attacks?  Two case studies using one country (Georgia) and one region 
(Southeast Asia) were examined to determine if the engagement produces the outcomes that are said to 
help counter biological threats.  In both case studies, using three metrics of increased biosecurity, 
biosurveillance capability, and biological-related partnerships with the United States, CBEP demonstrated 
a positive effect to varying degrees.  Given the limited hard power defense solutions to countering the 
broad biological threat, this type of soft power program may be the most effective and important long 
term. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
      More time for research and more robust data are needed to solidify these findings.  The first 
chapter could be improved in many ways.  Having no comprehensive list and no post-graduation tracking 
of IMET alumnae creates many holes in research data that have to be discounted to some extent to make 
solid conclusions.  The data used in this thesis could only come from what is publically available with a 
reliance on broad reporting of trends instead of specific cases.  For example, it would have been 
enlightening to be able to research specific cases of human rights abuses inflicted by foreign militaries to 
determine whom the commanders were at the time and if they were IMET graduates.  That was not 
possible so conclusions had to be made based on overall trends.  Additionally, the IMET program is very 
diverse in that it covers many different types of U.S. military institutions and lengths of study.  In order to 
more accurately make solid conclusions, it would have been better to have taken one institution within the 
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IMET program (such as the U.S. National Defense University‟s National War College) and studied the 
impact that 1-year course had on its foreign graduates.  Presently, such follow-up data does not exist.   
     The major limitation of the second chapter on the U.S. Navy‟s hospital ship deployments was the 
fact that there are so many other factors that can sway American access, influence, and visibility in a 
region.  Determining visibility and influence is not an exact science.  Public opinion polls are not 
standardized and often do not ask the right questions to tease out the specific impacts of these 
engagements.  Increased access and influence can be attributed to leadership personalities or domestic 
politics and this thesis did not take into account all possible reasons for this in its case studies.   
For chapter three, it is difficult to prove the program‟s effectiveness if biological weapons are 
never used.  The program may never be able to be proven effective if a biological attack does not occur 
because one would never know why a biological weapon was not used.  Was the reason because the strong 
scientific and surveillance networks deterred its use, or not?  Additionally, each country is different in 
terms of its own health capacity, internal politics, and its diplomatic and cultural relationship with the 
United States so comparing even quantifiable results such as number of scientists trained or number of 
facilities upgraded, may not be enormously useful in applying past results in one country with future 
engagement expansion in another.  In other words, one size does not fit all; so replicating what the United 
States accomplished in the FSU may not be applicable to all other countries in the same way. 
 
Implications for Further Research 
      In each chapter, research highlighted interesting new questions for further study.  For example, 
the IMET program‟s effects might be able to be demonstrated better if one were to compare two similar 
countries‟ militaries, one having a strong IMET relationship and one having little or no IMET 
involvement.  Could we see a clear difference in those foreign militaries‟ respect for democratic values?  
Another approach would be to take a detailed look into one country‟s military and compare the actions of 
military leaders who were IMET graduates and who were not.  Could we see a difference in respect for 
democratic values?  For example, how would IMET trained military leaders compare against their non-
IMET trained counterparts when it comes to such things as gender-based violence in conflict zones?  
Supposedly, IMET trained officers have been exposed to female military officers from the West through 
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their training with them.  Would this make a difference in their leadership after they returned to their 
countries?   
For the second chapter, further study on the long-term impact of proactive medical deployments 
should be considered.  This would require going back to the specific regions in countries where medical 
deployments occurred in the past and assessing the health and psychological impact of the missions years 
later.  Did these missions make a lasting positive impression on the populations?  Do the local people 
remember the operations?  Another idea for further research would be to compare the impact of U.S. 
Navy medical missions versus other U.S. government humanitarian efforts in similar regions.  Are there 
better, more cost effective ways to have the same humanitarian visibility and impact in a country using 
other agencies like USAID or is there no substitute for a large white hospital ship or a small fleet of 
warships present off the coast as a sign of goodwill?   
Finally, chapter three presents many new questions for further research.  The results from CBEP 
in the FSU should be compared in some way to the status in a similar country with whom the United 
States has had no biological outreach to determine the level of impact associated with CBEP.  Have there 
been more outbreaks in similar countries in which America has no engagements?  Have similar outbreaks 
in both a CBEP country and a non-CBEP country been handled so differently as to effect the response 
times and the numbers of people sickened or killed regionally and globally?  It would also be interesting to 
compare CBEP to its counterpart programs in other U.S. federal agencies.  For example, CBEP holds ten 
times the amount of funding per year compared to its State Department counterpart.  Are the results of 
CBEP somehow ten times more effective?  What are the benefits of using an agency such as the 
Department of Health and Human Services for the same type of outreach instead of the Department of 
Defense?  When compared, which program is most valuable in terms of effectiveness and overall cost?  
 
Final Thoughts 
      It is interesting to note that these three programs can all be united to each other within the 
defense and security context.  For example, the Vietnamese Military and Ministry of Health allowed the 
U.S. Navy to begin its semi-annual proactive medical deployments to that country in 2007.  Just four years 
later, Vietnam agreed to send its first senior Vietnamese military officer to attend the U.S. National 
Defense University through IMET.  Today, Vietnam‟s military and health sectors are now interested in 
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partnering with the United States to raise its bio-surveillance standards through DOD‟s CBEP program.  
This raises interesting questions as to how the outreach of these programs helps develop new relationships 
not previously seen.  One soft power door that is opened produces the unlocking of other doors in 
different areas but all tied by a broader security framework.  There seems to be little negative effects of a 
growing soft power partnership with another country.  Softer connections made through medical forces, 
scientific, or military leadership educational training are likely to be less threatening to other countries 
(particularly adversaries) than arms sales or security agreements.  While acknowledging the concern that 
these softer programs being nested within the Department of Defense may lead to the a growing 
militarization of U.S. foreign policy, there are tangible benefits of these programs being managed by the 
DOD.  In the current American political system, the defense budget far outweighs the budgets of other 
federal agencies (including the Department of State and HHS) and has done so for some time.  This 
mismatch in funding over time directly results in DOD‟s greater global operational capability in personnel 
and logistics in comparison with other agencies.  While DOD may not be the most ideal organization to 
take on proactive medical engagement or work to increase biological scientific networks, it may be the 
most practical.  Additionally, if foreign countries can create security partnerships through the connections 
made during the implementation of these softer programs, they may be more likely to trust the U.S. 
military and DOD as a partner rather than an adversary in a time of crisis. 
      Each one of these program‟s direct soft power influence is limited to a certain extent and 
measuring the soft power associated with them is imperfect.  However, they all have some value now and 
potentially great value should their connections and links be needed in a future crisis.  The IMET program 
was clearly designed to increase military-to-military (security related) associations on a personal level.  
However, it does show some degree of reaching foreign military leaders in a softer way, extending western 
ideas to a greater range than having no program at all.  Is the IMET program going to change all of the 
foreign military students‟ actions and opinions on democratic values in significant ways? No – but the 
program does seem to have selected impact that, in addition to its design of increasing security related 
connections, is worth the small cost.  The soft power effects of U.S. Navy hospital ships and warships to 
perform proactive medical deployments around the world may never be fully realized.  However, the 
connections and goodwill bought with these deployments (regionally and globally) may become very useful 
in the future.  The United States is one of the only countries in the world with such capability and if these 
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partnered efforts continue, much like what we have seen recently in the disaster relief effort in the 
Philippines, one never knows when the United States might need to draw on its networks and influence 
fostered by these proactive deployments in the future.  Can anyone ever prove that DOD‟s Cooperative 
Biological Engagement Program stops a bioterrorist or a biological weapon attack on the United States?  
No – but it does build global resiliency should an attack occur in another region of the world and could 
lessen the consequences to the United States of an attack originating elsewhere.  It increases the global 
capability to narrow down the source of an attack and increases the international scientific and security 
connections that can mitigate the impact of a bioterrorist attack by helping to stop the spread of a 
pathogen more quickly.  It is very difficult to impose bio-surveillance and scientific networks on other 
countries.  They have to desire and value the involvement of the United States and the international 
community.  Advancing this desire is the purpose for the soft power approach.  If these countries can be 
solicited to partner with the United States through CBEP, then their overall resiliency toward biological 
attacks increases, thereby increasing global resiliency.  Overall, these programs‟ modest quantifiable 
effectiveness and present-day significance are greatly outweighed by their low cost and their potential 
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Marine Corps Interagency Liaison to Department of State and USAID, 
     Headquarters Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.   (2012-2014)                                                  
Defense Congressional Fellow, Office of Congresswoman Susan A. Davis, CA-53,  
     U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.  (2011) 
Deputy Future Operations Officer, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, 
     Camp Leatherneck, Helmand, Afghanistan    (2010) 
F/A-18 Pilot, Marine Fighter-Attack Squadron – 121, and Fighter-Attack Squadron 106  
     Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California   (2006-2009) 
F/A-18 Weapons Systems Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron – 121 and 101 
    Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California   (2000-2004) 
    Iraq combat deployment – 2003 




Mother of one son (soon to be two) 
 
